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BEYOND PRICE WA TERHO USE V HOPKINS: A
NEW APPROACH TO MIXED MOTIVE
DISCRIMINATION
MARK C. WEBERt
Under the common law of torts, a wrongdoer whose act combines
with other forces may be held liable for harm that results, regardless of
the other causes, as long as the wrongful act was a dominant or substan-
tial cause of the harm. In employment discrimination cases under Title
VII of the Civil Rights Act, however, as the United States Supreme
Court recently held in Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, an employer who
acts to the detriment of an employee or applicant based on both a dis-
criminatory motive and a legitimate motive will escape liability if the
same action would have resulted from the legitimate motive alone. In
this Article Professor Weber argues that the Price Waterhouse Court,
although increasing the likelihood of relief by shifting the burden of
proof on the cause-in-fact issue to the employer, still has not afforded
justice to victims of discrimination. The Article proposes to replace the
Court's result with a finding of full liability whenever discrimination
plays a part in employment decisions, arguing that such an approach is
more consistent with philosophical and legal causation theories, reme-
dial policies, and the statutory provisions of Title VII. The Article con-
cludes that only the undue hardship doctrine, which protects defendants
and the public from onerous or wasteful equitable remedies, should pre-
vent the award offull relief when a discriminatory motive contributes to
an employment action.
In many employment discrimination cases brought under Title VII,1 the
facts establish that the employer fired or failed to hire or promote the plaintiff
for a mixture of discriminatory and legitimate reasons. In Price Waterhouse v.
Hopkins2 a fragmented Supreme Court ruled that in these "mixed motive"
cases, the employer may escape liability by proving by a preponderance of the
evidence that it would have made the same decision in the absence of discrimina-
tory reasons.
3
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1. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e to 2000e-17 (1982).
2. 109 S. Ct. 1775 (1989).
3. Id. at 1792 (plurality opinion of Justice Brennan); id. at 1796 (White,-J., concurring). Jus-
tice O'Connor filed a separate concurrence in the judgment. Id. at 1796 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justice Scalia joined in a dissent by Justice Kennedy. Id: at 1806 (Ken-
nedy, J., dissenting). The Court reversed the United States Court of Appeals for the District of
Columbia Circuit, which had ruled that the employer must prove by clear and convincing evidence
that the same decision would have been made absent the discrimination. Hopkins v. Price
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The dissenters argued that the Court went too far in shifting the burden of
proof to the employer;4 instead, the employee should have to prove by a prepon-
derance of evidence that the employer would not have made the same decision in
the absence of discrimination.
5
This Article argues that the Supreme Court did not go far enough. In a
mixed motive case, the only way for a court to act consistently with precedent,
logic, and policy is to find liability and award full relief. Only the undue hard-
ship doctrine, which protects defendants from particularly onerous or wasteful
equitable remedies, should limit the recovery.
This Article's new approach to mixed motive discrimination is based not on
conventional Title VII jurisprudence but on common-law cases that involve
mixed motives or other combined wrongful and innocent causes. In cases of
wrongful interference with contract, courts find liability and award full relief
upon a showing that the wrongful motive was the dominant one.6 In analogous
tort cases involving negligent and nonnegligent sources of a single harm, courts
find liability and award full relief if the negligent cause is a substantial factor in
bringing about the harm.
7
Philosophical and legal theories of causation also support an approach to
mixed motive discrimination that finds liability and awards full relief.8 A dis-
criminatory cause is still a cause, even if it is mixed with other factors, and even
if those other factors would have produced the same effect in the absence of the
discriminatory cause.
Even more importantly, finding liability and awarding full relief in mixed
motive cases promotes the remedial policies of compensation, deterrence, and
furtherance of the community's sense of justice, and it is consistent with statu-
tory policies.9 Although there are possible objections to the proposed approach
based on practicality, the objections can be avoided if courts apply the undue
hardship doctrine traditionally used in Title VII cases and other actions for eq-
uitable relief. 10
Ever since Mount Healthy City School District Board of Education v.
Doyle," an early mixed motive case involving discrimination in violation of the
Waterhouse, 825 F.2d 458, 470-71 (D.C. Cir. 1987), rev'd, 109 S. Ct. 1775 (1989). For a more
detailed description of the opinions, see infra text accompanying notes 26-106.
4. Price Waterhouse, 109 S. Ct. at 1812-13 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
5. Id. at 1809 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
6. See infra notes 108-14 and accompanying text.
7. See infra notes 115-41 and accompanying text.
8. See infra notes 154-82 and accompanying text.
9. See infra notes 223-318 and accompanying text.
10. See infra notes 319-28 and accompanying text.
11. 429 U.S. 274 (1977). In Mount Healthy the Supreme Court reversed a federal district court
decision reinstating and giving tenure and back pay to the plaintiff, who was previously an untenured
teacher. See infra notes 205-13 and accompanying text (discussing Mount Healthy). Although the
case involved the first amendment rather than the laws forbidding race or sex discrimination, the
Court suggested the analogy in two subsequent Title VII cases. East Tex. Motor Freight Sys. v.
Rodriguez, 431 U.S. 395, 404 n.9 (1977); International Bhd. of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S.
324, 367-68 (1977). The hint was not lost on the lower courts. E.g., Mack v. Cape Elizabeth School
Bd., 553 F.2d 720, 722 (Ist Cir. 1977).
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first amendment, courts have ignored the possibility of such an approach.
1 2
Moreover, while engaging in a robust debate over the positions ultimately taken
in the plurality opinion, the concurrences, and the dissent in Price Waterhouse,
academic critics have summarily rejected this approach. Thus, although several
commentators suggest the inconsistency between denying liability and relief in
mixed motive cases and imposing them in analogous common-law cases, 13 and
even though they and another authority accept multiple causation paradigms as
valid causation theory, 14 all stop short of endorsing liability and full relief in
mixed motive cases. The commentators' real, if not fully developed, complaint
about the approach is that it violates remedial principles. Nevertheless, a careful
analysis of general and statutory remedial policies fails to support the complaint.
Part I of this Article describes mixed motive cases and the Supreme Court's
approach to them before Price Waterhouse. Part II describes Price Waterhouse
and its approach. Part III puts forward the common-law solution to the mixed
motive problem, discussing cases in which motives determine liability and analo-
gous cases with multiple wrongful and innocent causes of harm. Part IV exam-
ines causation theory, comparing the merits of this Article's proposed approach,
12. Courts did adopt such an approach before Mount Healthy. See, eg., United States v. Hayes
Int'l Corp., 6 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 1328, 1330 (N.D. Ala. 1973); see Brodin, The Standard
of Causation in the Mixed-Motive Title VII Action: A Social Policy Perspective, 82 COLUM. L. Ruv.
292, 308 & n.75 (collecting cases). By the time Price Waterhouse came down, the Circuit Courts of
Appeal had taken five different approaches: (1) No violation unless the plaintiff proves that but for
the discrimination, the decision would not have been the same, McQuillen v. Wisconsin Educ. Ass'n
Council, 830 F.2d 659, 664-65 (7th Cir. 1987), cerL denied, 108 S. Ct. 1068 (1988); Peters v. City of
Shreveport, 818 F.2d 1148, 1161 (5th Cir. 1987), cerL dismissed, 108 S. Ct. 1101,(1988); Bellisimo v.
Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 764 F.2d 175, 179 (3d Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 475 U.S. 1035 (1986); Ross
v. Communications Satellite Corp., 759 F.2d 355, 365-66 (4th Cir. 1985); (2) No violation if the
defendant proves by a preponderance of evidence that but for the discrimination, the decision would
have been the same, Ber v. County of Westchester, 849 F.2d 712, 714-15 (2d Cir. 1988); Terbovitz v.
Fiscal Court, 825 F.2d 111, 115 (6th Cir. 1987); Fields v. Clark Univ., 817 F.2d 931, 936-37 (lst Cir.
1987); Bell v. Birmingham Linen Serv., 715 F.2d 1552, 1557 (1lth Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 467 U.S.
1204 (1984); (3) No violation if the defendant proves by clear and convincing evidence that but for
the discrimination, the decision would have been the same, Toney v. Block, 705 F.2d 1364, 1366
(D.C. Cir. 1983); (4) Violation, but no award of back pay or reinstatement if the defendant proves by
a preponderance of evidence that but for the discrimination, the decision would have been the same,
Bibbs v. Block, 778 F.2d 1318, 1323-24 (8th Cir. 1985) (en banc); (5) Violation, but no award of
backpay or reinstatement if the defendant proves by clear and convincing evidence that but for the
discrimination, the decision would have been the same, Fadhl v. City and County of San Francisco,
741 F.2d 1163, 1166-67 (9th Cir. 1984). See Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 109 S. Ct. at 1784 n.2.
13. Brodin, supra note 12, at 315 & n.99; Eaton, Causation in Constitutional Torts, 67 IowA L.
REV. 443, 454 (1982); Stonefield, Non-Determinative Discrimination, Mixed Motives, and the Inner
Boundary of Discrimination Law, 35 BUFFALO L. REv. 85, 121 (1986). A seminal critique of Mount
Healthy is Wolly, What Hath Mount Healthy Wrought?, 41 OHIO ST. L.J. 385 (1980). Other discus-
sions of mixed motive discrimination include Note, Title VII Mixed-Motive Cases: The Eighth Cir-
cuit Adds a Second Track of Liability and Remedy, 36 DRAKE L. REv. 155 (1986-87), and
Comment, Designing Procedure to Suit Title VlI's Purpose: Bibbs v. Block, 60 ST. JOHN'S L. REV.
742 (1986). In a recent note, one student commentator suggests that all mixed motive cases should
be handled as direct evidence cases. Note, Clearing the Mixed-Motive Smokescreen: An Approach to
Disparate Treatment Under Title VII, 87 MICH. L. Rav. 863, 893-94 (1989) [hereinafter Note,
Mixed-Motive Smokescreen]. The note, however, fails to evaluate causation in those cases.
Although it provides some support for the view of liability and remedy advanced in this Article, see
id. at 869 n.34, it appears to endorse Price Waterhouse's approach for awarding relief, id. at 874 n.68,
and perhaps even for the imposition of liability, see id. at 879-80, 892-93. Apparently it would
approve a shift in the burden of persuasion. Id. at 883.
14. Belton, Causation in Employment Discrimination Law, 34 WAYNE L. REv. 1235, 1244
(1988). See also supra note 13 and sources cited therein.
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which follows the common law, with those of the Price Waterhouse plurality,
concurrers, and dissenters. Finally, Part V compares the proposed approach
with those of the Price Waterhouse Court and the academic commentators with
respect to appropriateness of remedy. It considers whether the common-law
approach furthers the policy of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. Then
it answers practical objections to the proposed approach.
I. MIXED MOTIVE DISCRIMINATION
Mixed motive cases are those in which an employer takes action against an
employee or applicant both for legitimate reasons, such as misconduct or lack of
qualifications, and for discriminatory reasons, such as racial or sexual hostility
or stereotypes.
Mixed motive cases are cases of intentional discrimination, because the de-
fendant intentionally treats the victim differently from others on account of an
impermissible distinguishing characteristic.15 Although the defendant has other
legitimate intentions, such as the intention to obtain the most productive work
force, he nevertheless is motivated in part by an intention to discriminate.
In these cases, the term "motive" is used interchangeably with "intent." Of
course, the two terms are not identical in many legal applications. Ordinarily,
intentions are immediate objectives, such as the intent to steal, whereas motives
are more basic or underlying objectives, such as the motive to be wealthy. 16 The
concepts have become blurred because of the analogy between discrimination on
the basis of race and sex in violation of Title VII 17 and discrimination against
employees in order to encourage or discourage membership in a union in viola-
tion of the National Labor Relations Act. 18 The former type of discrimination
involves an intent (to disadvantage the black or woman), but the latter type of
discrimination involves a motive (to discriminate against the union memberfor
15. Mr. Schnapper has identified two types of discriminatory intent, which correspond roughly
to "because of" and "in spite of." Schnapper, Two Categories of Discriminatory Intent, 17 HARV.
C.R.-C.L. L. REv. 31, 38 (1982). It is clear that antidiscrimination laws bar treating a person worse
because the person is black or female. But see Feeney v. Massachusetts, 475 F. Supp. 109, 110 (D.
Mass. 1979) (implying that a governmental body may knowingly disadvantage blacks, females, or
other protected groups to achieve a legitimate objective), aff'd mem. sub. nom. Feeney v. Personnel
Adm'r, 445 U.S. 901 (1980). "In spite of" intent satisfies criminal intent requirements. Cook, Act,
Intention, and Motive in the Criminal Law, 26 YALE L.J. 645, 657-59 (1917). The issue of "in spite
of" discrimination is beyond the scope of the mixed motive discussion in this Article, which confines
itself to illegal discriminatory intent mixed with another, legitimate intention.
16. A wrongful act is seldom desired for its own sake .... The evil which he does to
another, he does and desires only for the sake of some resulting good which he will obtain
for himself. He intends the attainment of this ulterior object no less that (sic] he intends the
wrongful act itself. His intent, therefore, is twofold, and is divisible into two distinct por-
tions, which we may distinguish as his immediate and his ulterior intent. The former re-
lates to the wrongful act itself, the latter is that which passes beyond the wrongful act, and
relates to the object or series of objects for the sake of which the act is done. The ulterior
intent is called the motive of the act.
Hitchler, Motive As an Essential Element of Crime, 35 DICK. L. REV. 105, 108 (1931); see Cook,
supra note 15, at 660-61.
17. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e to 2000e-17 (1982).
18. 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(3) (1982).
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the goal of encouraging or discouraging union membership). 19 Predictably,
cases in which an employer fired an employee without firing other employees,
both for the object of discouraging union membership and for another, legiti-
mate object, became known as "dual motive" or "mixed motive" cases.20 The
analogy, and the borrowed alliterative terminology, was impossible to resist in
Title VII cases involving an intent to discriminate on race or sex grounds as well
as an intent to select employees to maximize productivity. Hence the prevailing
term is now "mixed motive," though it might as well be "mixed intent."
2 1
A mixture of intents or motives in a case will always create a doubt whether
the adverse action that caused the harm would have occurred anyway. Not only
is it possible that a legitimate motive might have been more important than the
wrongful one in the mind of the person making the decision, but it is also possi-
ble that, had the wrongful motive not loomed as large as it did, the legitimate
one would have expand6d in importance to occupy its position. For example,
even though a person who refused to hire a black applicant might be a flagrant
racist whose passions overwhelmed his residual, legitimate doubts about the ap-
plicant's abilities, it might still be true that without the passions, he might have
denied her the job because of the residual doubts. The term "duplicative cause"
fits mixed motive cases because two causes, either of which would alone cause
the harm, operate simultaneously.
2 2
The United States Supreme Court first addressed mixed motive employ-
ment discrimination in 1977 in Mount Healthy City School District Board of
Education v. Doyle.2 3 In Mount Healthy a school board discharged a teacher
19. Christensen & Svanoe, Motive and Intent in the Commission of Unfair Labor Practices: The
Supreme Court and the Fictive Formality, 77 YALE L.J. 1269, 1271 (1968).
20. Even in the labor law cases, the terms "motive" and "intent" have been used so loosely that
there is no longer any practical distinction between them. Id. at 1271 n.4.
21. Dean Welch contends that a clarification of motive and intent is desirable, and that dispa-
rate treatment cases should require a showing only of motive and not of intent. Welch, Removing
Discriminatory Barriers: Basing Disparate Treatment Analysis on Motive Rather Than Intent, 60 S.
CAL. L. REV. 733, 735 (1987). See generally Christensen & Svanoe, supra note 19, at 1273-1314
(tracing the proof of intent requirement for some violations of the National Labor Relations Act
from its origin as a permissible use of apparent motive to infer intent). These matters are beyond the
scope of this Article.
22. See Wright, Causation in Tort Law, 73 CALIF. L. REV. 1735, 1775-76 (1985). Closely re-
lated to mixed motive cases are hypothetical alternative cause cases. A hypothetical alternative
cause case is one in which the motives are not mixed in the discriminator's decision to take adverse
action against the protected individual. The wrongful motive is the only one driving the decision.
Nevertheless, the evidence in the case demonstrates that the adverse action-the failure to hire or
the discharge-would have occurred anyway. See, eg., Edwards v. Jewish Hosp., 855 F.2d 1345
(8th Cir. 1988). In Edwards a black man sued a hospital under 42 U.S.C. § 1981 (1982) for discrimi-
nation in discharging him from his job as a security guard after he failed a lie detector test regarding
a theft at the hospital. Id. at 1347. The jury found that race was a substantial and motivating factor
in the hospital's decision. Id. at 1348. Several white security guards also failed the test but were not
discharged. Moreover, the whites all were on duty when the theft occurred, but the black employee
was on leave. Id. But the jury also found that the hospital would have discharged the black em-
ployee even if race had not been a substantial and motivating factor, apparently because he created a
disturbance and acted in a threatening fashion on another occasion. Id. at 1348.
Some commentators use the term "preemptive causation" to describe hypothetical alternative
cause cases. See Wright, supra, at 1794-98. The wrongful conduct does induce the harm, but an-
other cause is waiting in the wings to preempt its effects. A full discussion of these cases is beyond
the scope of this Article.
23. 429 U.S. 274 (1977).
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both because of protected speech and because of apparently genuine miscon-
duct.24 The Supreme Court stated that if the employer "would have reached
that decision had not the constitutionally protected incident ... occurred," the
decision against renewing employment would not "necessarily amount to a con-
stitutional violation justifying remedial action."
'25
II. PRICE WATERHOUSE v. HOPKINS APPROACH TO MIXED MOTIVE
DIsCRIMINATION
In Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins26 a woman associate sued an accounting
firm for sex discrimination in its decision to deny her a promotion to partner.27
A significant, motivating factor in the partnership decision was stereotyped
thinking about the plaintiff's need for a "course at charm school," her
"overcompensat[ion] for being a woman," and the importance that she "walk
more femininely,"2 8 despite her extraordinary ability to generate new business
for the firm and the fact that she billed more hours than any other partnership
candidate.2 9 But another factor was her harsh treatment of staff,30 a legitimate
ground on which to deny her the promotion. The district court found that the
accounting firm refused to promote the plaintiff for both discriminatory and le-
gitimate, nondiscriminatory reasons.31 The district court held the defendant lia-
ble but declined to order back pay and reinstatement. The United States Court
of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit affirmed the district court's deci-
sion on liability and reversed on relief.3
2
The Supreme Court's plurality opinion, written by Justice Brennan and
joined by Justices Blackmun, Marshall and Stevens, announced the Court's deci-
sion to reverse the court of appeals. 33 The Court found no clear error in the
district court's factual conclusion that Price Waterhouse applied sex stereotypes
in refusing to promote the plaintiff.34 It held that the court of appeals had been
correct in placing on the employer the burden of proof to establish that it would
have made the same decision in the absence of sex stereotyping. 35 Nevertheless,
the Court reversed and remanded for further proceedings because the court of
24. The teacher had protested the school's dress code policy on a radio broadcast. The teacher
also had been involved in an altercation in the school cafeteria. Id. at 281-83.
25. Id. at 285. The Court's peculiar phrasing left unclear whether it believed that no liability
attaches to the employer's conduct, or whether it believed that no remedy is appropriate under the
circumstances. See infra text accompanying note 212.
26. 109 S. Ct. 1775 (1989).
27. See id. at 1781.
28. Id. at 1782.
29. Hopkins v. Price Waterhouse, 825 F.2d 458, 462 (D.C. Cir. 1987), rev'd, 109 S. Ct. 1775
(1989).
30. Price Waterhouse, 109 S. Ct. at 1782.
31. Hopkins v. Price Waterhouse, 618 F. Supp. 1109, 1114-19 (D.D.C. 1985), aff'd in part,
rev'd in part, 825 F.2d 458 (D.C. Cir. 1987), rey'd, 109 S. Ct. 1775 (1989).
32. Hopkins v. Price Waterhouse, 825 F.2d 458, 473 (D.C. Cir. 1987), rey'd, 109 S. Ct. 1775
(1989).
33. Price Waterhouse, 109 S. Ct. at 1795.
34. Id. at 1793-94.
35. Id. at 1787.
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appeals had incorrectly imposed a clear and convincing evidence standard on
Price Waterhouse's contention that it would have made the decision for legiti-
mate reasons. 36 The Court held that the correct standard was the preponder-
ance of the evidence.3 7 The plurality commented that the employer should
satisfy its burden with objective evidence.
38
Justice White concurred in the judgment.39 He limited, the scope of the
holding by rejecting the plurality's statement that the employer should produce
objective evidence to satisfy its burden.4° Justice O'Connor wrote a separate
opinion concurring in the judgment. 41 Justice Kennedy dissented, joined by
Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justice Scalia.
42
The plurality began by considering the multiple causation found in a mixed
motive case. "But-for causation" is a concept familiar to lawyers. To tell
whether one event is the cause of another, the court asks whether the event
would have happened in the absence of the cause.43 The plurality, however,
distinguished Title VII's causation standard from the "hypothetical construct"
of but-for causation.44 It said that Title VII focuses on whether gender (or race
or religion) "was a factor in the employment decision at the moment it was
made.' '4 5 In a mixed motive discrimination case, a but-for test would ask
whether, if the factor had been absent, the employer would have made same
decision anyway.46 Such a test might make sense in a case involving pretext, in
which there is a single (either discriminatory or legitimate) cause of the adverse
action.47 But in a multiple causation situation, be it one of mixed motivations or
combining physical forces, a pure but-for test yields the absurd conclusion that
events can have no (but-for) causes at all.48 The plurality noted that Congress
rejected an amendment to Title VII that would have put "solely" before "be-
cause of such individual's ... sex."'49 It also argued that Congress recognized
mixed motivation by permitting race or sex preference if race or sex is a bona
fide occupational qualification for a job, as well as by proscribing indirect, dispa-
rate impact discrimination. 50
36. Id. at 1793.
37. Id.
38. Id. at 1791.
39. Id. at 1795 (White, J., concurring).
40. Id. at 1796 (White, J., concurring).
41. Id. at 1796 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
42. Id. at 1806 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
43. W. PROSSER & W. KEETON, PROSSER & KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS 265 (5th ed.
1984).
44. Price Waterhouse, 109 S. Ct. at 1785.
45. Id. (emphasis in original). The opinion emphasized "the present, active tense of the opera-
tive verbs of § 703(a)(1) [of Title VII] ('to fail or refuse')." Id.
46. Id.
47. See id. at 1785 n.6.
48. Id. at 1786. The opinion gave the example of two physical forces moving an object when
either acting alone would have moved it. The but-for test would imply that neither force was a cause
of the movement, because but for either, the object still would have moved. As Justice Brennan
stated, it cannot be true that events that are "causally overdetermined" have no cause at all. Id.
49. Id. at 1785 & n.7.
50. Id. at 1786.
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Nevertheless, the plurality rejected the idea that an employer violates Title
VII whenever an employee's sex plays a motivating part in an employer's ad-
verse decision. Under that approach, the question whether the decision would
have been the same absent the illegal motive would be solely a matter of remedy.
Justice Brennan stated that Title VII preserved management prerogatives to in-
sist that employees meet job qualifications.51 Moreover, he said that Title VII's
provision restricting the award of reinstatement and back pay to those who suf-
fered adverse action "for any reason other than discrimination"5 2 was not an
affirmative requirement that the court find liability and impose relief other than
reinstatement when the defendant discriminates but the plaintiff suffers adverse
action for both discriminatory and legitimate reasons.
53
The plurality justified shifting the burden of proof to the employer by draw-
ing analogies to other situations in which, when an employer uses a forbidden
criterion, it suffers the burden of proving that the outcome would have been the
same if it had not used the criterion.5 4 The opinion cited cases on the bona fide
occupational qualification exception to Title VII,55 the Equal Pay Act's proviso
permitting disparate pay as a result of a "factor other than sex,"'56 and the Preg-
nancy Discrimination Act's stipulation that necessary limits on work may be
imposed.57 It gave special prominence to Mount Healthy City School District
Board of Education v. Doyle,5 8 in which the Court ruled that once an employee
shows that constitutionally protected speech was a motivating factor in the em-
51. Id. at 1786-87.
52. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g) (1982).
53. Price Waterhouse, 109 S. Ct. at 1787 n.10. Justice Brennan went on to note that prior
decisions "suggest that the proper focus of § 706(g) is on claims of systematic discrimination, not on
charges of individual discrimination." Id. See generally infra text accompanying notes 308-15 (dis-
cussing section 706(g) in the context of the approach to mixed motive and hypothetical alternative
cause discrimination advanced in this Article).
54. Price Waterhouse,'109 S. Ct. at 1789-90. The plurality distinguished Texas Dep't of Com-
munity Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248 (1981). Burdine held that the burden of producing evidence,
but not the burden of persuasion, shifts in a disparate treatment case. Burdine, 450 U.S. at 253-54.
For example, in a sex discrimination case the plaintiff must show that she is qualified for a position
and either (1) was not hired and the employer continued to accept applications, or (2) was replaced
by a male with equal or lesser qualifications. Id. at 253-54 n.6. The employer then must present
evidence of a legitimate business reason for its conduct, at which point the plaintiff can show that the
reason is pretextual. See id. at 256-58. The Price Waterhouse plurality found Burdine irrelevant. It
said that the plaintiff in a mixed motive case need not "squeeze her proof into Burdine's framework,
Where a decision was the product of a mixture of legitimate and illegitimate motives .... it simply
makes no sense to ask whether the legitimate reason was 'the true reason' (Brief for Petitioner 20
(emphasis added) for the decision-which is the question asked by Burdine." Price Waterhouse, 109
S. Ct. at 1788-89 (emphasis and citation in original). The Court then cited precedent in which courts
shifted the burden of persuasion to the defendant. It did not further consider whether Burdine might
apply by analogy, and thus call merely for a shift of the burden of production in the mixed motive
situation. Id. at 1789. Even though Burdine did not receive such extended treatment, the analogies
chosen by the plurality, in which the burden of persuasion does shift, appear closer than Burdine.
See infra text accompanying notes 55-57. This Article suggests an approach that renders irrelevant
the entire question of what the employer would have done in the absence of discrimination.
55. Dothard v. Rawlinson, 433 U.S. 321, 332-37 (1977) (construing 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(e)
(1982)).
56. Coming Glass Works v. Brennan, 417 U.S. 188, 196 (1974) (construing 29 U.S.C.
§ 206(d)(1) (1982)).
57. Hayes v. Shelby Memorial Hosp., 726 F.2d 1543, 1548 (1Ith Cir. 1984); Wright v. Olin
Corp., 697 F.2d 1172, 1187 (4th Cir. 1982) (construing 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(l) (1982)).
58. 429 U.S. 274 (1977).
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ployer's decision, the employer has to prove "by a preponderance of the evi-
dence that it would have reached the same decision ... even in the absence of
the protected conduct."'59 It also quoted NLRB v. Transportation Management
Corp.,6° which shifted the burden of proof to the employer in cases involving the
National Labor Relations Act's prohibition of affirmative relief for discrimina-
tion against a union member if the member is discharged for cause.61 As in the
Title VII context, "'[t]he employer is a wrongdoer; he has acted out of a motive
that is declared illegitimate by the statute. It is fair that he bear the risk that the
influence of legal and illegal motives cannot be separated, because he knowingly
created the risk .... ',62 The opinion said that in most cases, the employer
would need to prove by objective evidence that its legitimate motives would have
caused it to make the same decision.
63
The plurality nevertheless rejected the court of appeals' holding that the
burden of proof not only shifts, but also rises to the standard of clear and con-
vincing evidence. It noted that "[c]onventional rules of civil litigation generally
apply in Title VII cases" 64 and that an elevated standard of proof applies only in
cases in which the government seeks to take away personal liberty and in a few
other exotic situations. 65 It distinguished situations in which the higher stan-
dard applies to relief determinations on the ground that the test applies to liabil-
ity.66 The plurality again drew analogies to the most closely comparable cases,
Mount Healthy and Transportation Management, each of which applied a pre-
ponderance of the evidence standard.
67
The plurality reaffirmed 6 8 that Title VII forbids employers to engage in sex
stereotyping.69 Although it stated that the evidence of sex stereotyping in Price
Waterhouse was sufficient to establish the plaintiff's case and shift the burden of
persuasion, the plurality declined to describe which facts, in general, would
make such a case.70 Justice Brennan did caution that workplace remarks based
on sex stereotypes do not inevitably prove that the employee's sex played a part
in an adverse employment decision, but stated that such remarks can be evi-
dence that it did.
71
In his concurrence, Justice White did not directly attack the plurality's rea-
59. Id. at 287.
60. 462 U.S. 393 (1983).
61. Id. at 403.
62. Price Waterhouse, 109 S. Ct. at 1790 (quoting Transportation Management, 462 U.S. at
403).
63. Id. at 1791. This comment appears to be the principal source of disagreement between the
plurality and Justice White. See id. at 1795. See generally infra text accompanying notes 72-80
(discussing White concurrence).
64. Price Waterhouse, 109 S. Ct. at 1792.
65. Id.
- 66. Id.
67. Id. at 1792-93.
68. See Los Angeles Dep't of Water & Power v. Manhart, 435 U.S. 702, 707 n.13 (1978).
69. Price Waterhouse, 109 S. Ct. at 1791. Sex stereotyping is the evaluation of persons by
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soning, but suggested that much of it was unnecessary. He would have relied
exclusively on the analogy to Mount Healthy,72 and would have avoided any
"semantic discussions" of but-for causation. 73 Justice White specifically agreed
with the plurality's distinction of Burdine and the other "pretext cases." 74 He
also agreed with the plurality that the employer's burden in mixed motive cases
goes to liability, not to remedy. 75 In describing his agreement with the result
reached by the plurality, however, he worked what might be either a change in
substance or merely in nuance:
[HIere, as in Mount Healthy, and as the Court now holds, Hopkins was
not required to prove that the illegitimate factor was the only, princi-
pal, or true reason for the petitioner's action. Rather,... her burden
was to show that the unlawful motive was a substantial factor in the
adverse employment action.
76
The emphasis on "substantial" might mean that he would apply the mixed mo-
tive framework to fewer cases than would the plurality, who, by avoiding the
word "substantial," may have anticipated use of the framework whenever there
is the slightest discriminatory taint to the decisionmaking process. 7 7 Neither
Justice Brennan nor Justice White is explicit on the matter, however, and the
facts of the case do not support any controversy, for there was no doubt that the
discriminatory motive met the substantial factor test.78
Justice White disagreed with the plurality's statement that ordinarily, when
an employer denies discrimination but is found to have been motivated in part
by it, the employer would need to submit objective evidence that the same deci-
sion would have been reached in the absence of discrimination. 79 Nevertheless,
72. Id. at 1795 (White, J., concurring).
73. Id. (White, J., concurring).
74. Id. at 1795-96 (White, J., concurring).
75. Id. at 1796 n.** (White, J., concurring).
76. Id. at 1795 (White, J., concurring) (emphasis in original).
77. The quoted passage contains a reference to the concurrence of Justice O'Connor. Id.
(White, J., concurring). This reference may further support the interpretation advanced in the text.
See infra text accompanying notes 81-92 (discussing O'Connor concurrence).
78. See Price Waterhouse, 109 S. Ct. at 1795 (White, J., concurring). The differences among the
plurality opinion, the White concurrence, and the O'Connor concurrence raise doubts about the
precedential effect of the case. Justice White endorses the result reached by the plurality and the
basic elements of its reasoning, thus establishing a majority. Still, to the extent that his opinion
might be thought to occupy a narrower ground than that of the plurality, it might be taken as
authoritative. See Marks v. United States, 430 U.S. 188, 192-93 (1977). Justice O'Connor rejects the
basics of the plurality's reasoning, although her approval of the result makes her opinion another
candidate for authoritativeness as representative of a majority with a different narrower ground. The
array of opinions thus suggests the possible existence of dual majorities, both of which may com-
mand authority. See Note, The Precedential Value of Supreme Court Plurality Decisions, 80 COLUM.
L. REV. 756, 767-69 (1980); Comment, Supreme Court No-Clear-Majority Decisions: A Study in
Stare Decisis, 24 U. CHI. L. REv. 99, 115-124 (1956). Nevertheless, because Justice O'Connor's
opinion has so little in common with that of the plurality, it is difficult to create a working majority
from it. Her disagreements with Justice White hamper the construction of a majority comprising
Justice O'Connor, Justice White, and the dissenters. See infra text accompanying notes 81-92 (dis-
cussing O'Connor concurrence). This Article attempts to find the best approach to mixed motive
discrimination. It criticizes all the opinions in Price Waterhouse, and it ultimately rejects those
approaches in favor of a position that the Court did not even consider.
79. Price Waterhouse, 109 S. Ct. at 1796 (White, J., concurring). Justice White stated that the
employer's own credible testimony that the legitimate reasons were present and that it would have
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he made no response to the plurality's charge that his position that the em-
ployer, who has already been found lying, is in such a case due special credence,
is "baffling." 80
In her concurrence, Justice O'Connor agreed that shifting the burden of
proof is proper in the liability determination when "the employer has created
uncertainty as to causation by knowingly giving substantial weight to an imper-
missible criterion." 8 But her emphasis on the uncertainty of causation under-
scored her disagreement with the plurality's reasoning. She contended that Title
VII requires but-for causation, but saw mixed motive cases as satisfying that test
if-and only if-the employer would not have reached the same decision on
legitimate grounds. 82 For the plurality, there was nothing uncertain about the
cause of the failure to promote: it was both the employer's sex stereotypes and
the plaintiff's abrasiveness. Nevertheless, because of the management preroga-
tives protected by Title VII, there is no liability if the candidate would not have
been promoted anyway. For Justice O'Connor, the causation question is not
answered until one knows whether the candidate would have been promoted in
the absence of illegal discrimination. 83 If there is causal uncertainty, she argued,
then the employer, who created it, ought to bear the burden of resolving it.
Management prerogatives, in Justice O'Connor's view, are irrelevant.
84
Justice O'Connor distinguished Burdine, which shifted only the burden of
production, on the ground that the showing Burdine requires of the plaintiff is
weaker than that in a case like Price Waterhouse.85 In a mixed motive case,
there is direct evidence of discriminatory intent.86 This stronger evidence justi-
acted for those reasons alone "should be ample proof," especially "where the employer denies any
illegitimate motive in the first place but the court finds that illegitimate, as well as legitimate, factors
motivated the adverse action." Id. (White, J., concurring).
80. Id. at 1791 n.14 (plurality opinion).
81. Id. at 1796 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
82. See id. at 1797 (O'Connor, J., concurring) ("[A] substantive violation of the statute only
occurs when consideration of an illegitimate criterion is the 'but-for' cause of an adverse employment
action.").
83. Id. (O'Connor, J., concurring).
84. Another difference between Justice O'Connor's opinion and that of the plurality is that the
O'Connor concurrence, in places, casually substituted the idea that the employer's decision would
have been justified in the absence of discrimination for the idea that the decision would have been the
same. See id. at 1799 (O'Connor, J., concurring) ("Moreover, placing the burden on the defendant
in this case to prove that the same decision would have been justified by legitimate reasons .... ); id.
at 1800 (O'Connor, J., concurring) ("an evidentiary rule which places the burden of persuasion on
the defendant to demonstrate that legitimate concerns would have justified an adverse employment
action"). But see id. at 1799 (O'Connor, J., concurring) ("calling upon the employer to show that
despite consideration of illegitimate factors the individual plaintiff would not have been hired or
promoted in any event"). The concepts are far from equivalent, as Justice Brennan indicated in the
plurality opinion. Id. at 1791 ("An employer may not ... prevail in a mixed-motives case by offering
a legitimate and sufficient reason for its decision if that reason did not motivate it at the time of the
decision."). See generally supra note 22 (discussing hypothetical alternative cause cases). But Jus-
tice O'Connor's inconsistency and the actual presence of two mixed motives in Price Waterhouse
render her substitution of terms insignificant.
85. Id. at 1801 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
86. The prima facie case established [in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792
(1973)] was not difficult to prove, and was based only on the statistical probability that
when a number of potential causes for an employment decision are eliminated an inference
arises that an illegitimate factor was in fact the motivation behind the decision. In the face
of this inferential proof, the employer's burden was deemed to be only one of production;
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fies shifting the burden of persuasion.87 She further noted that the employer has
superior access to evidence of its own intent, which justifies shifting the bur-
den. 88 Apparently anticipating the Court's rejection of a shift in the burden of
persuasion in disparate impact cases relying solely on statistical evidence, 8 9 she
went on to stress that Title VII supports stronger measures against explicit con-
sideration of race and other forbidden criteria, "the most obvious evil Congress
had in mind when it enacted Title VII." 90
Justice O'Connor would have placed some restrictions on the type of show-
ing that triggers the shift of the burden of persuasion in a mixed motive case,
requiring direct evidence that an illegal criterion was a substantial factor.91
"[S]tray remarks in the workplace" do not suffice, nor do statements of those
other than the decision makers, nor does even expert opinion, standing alone.92
In dissent, Justice Kennedy endorsed Justice O'Connor's approach to but-
for causation 93 and attacked the plurality for "inconsistency. '94 He argued that
it is inconsistent to say that discrimination, with other factors, caused the deci-
sion, but the employer nevertheless avoids liability if it shows the decision would
have come out the same way in the absence of discrimination. 95 The plutality's
position, according to Justice Kennedy, conflicts with the language of Title VII,
which establishes liability whenever an employer makes decisions "because of" a
forbidden criterion.
96
The dissent further argued that the entire issue of liability should be ana-
lyzed under the framework of Texas Department of Communitji Affairs v. Bur-
dine,97 which would entail a mere shift in the burden of producing evidence, not
a shift in the burden of persuasion. 98 The dissent noted that in a previous case
involving explicit racial remarks by the employer, the Court had used the Bur-
the employer must articulate a legitimate reason for the adverse employment action.... I
do not think that the employer is entitled to the same presumption of good faith where
there is direct evidence that it has placed substantial reliance on factors whose considera-
tion is forbidden by Title VII.
Id. at 1801 (O'Connor, J., concurring) (citations omitted). Justice O'Connor noted that the only
Supreme Court case to apply the Burdine framework in the face of direct evidence of discrimination
was United States Postal Serv. Bd. of Governors v. Aikens, 460 U.S. 711 (1983), in which the parties
never argued for any different consideration. In contrast, the Court found Burdine inapplicable in
Trans World Airlines, Inc. v. Thurston, 469 U.S. 111 (1985), a case involving direct evidence of
discrimination brought under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act.
87. Price Waterhouse, 109 S. Ct. at 1801 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
88. Id. at 1802 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
89. See Wards Cove Packing Co. v. Atonio, 109 S. Ct. 2115 (1989).
90. Price Waterhouse, 109 S. Ct. at 1803 (O'Connor, J., concurring) (quoting International
Bhd. of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 335 n.15 (1977)).
91. Id. at 1804 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
92. Id. at 1804-05 (O'Connor, J., concurring). Justice O'Connor, contrary to Justice Brennan,
id. at 1790 n.13 (plurality opinion), saw a great difference between the factual threshold she proposed
and that of the plurality, and she cited the concurrence by Justice White as supporting her position.
Id. at 1805 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
93. Id. at 1807 (Kennedy, 3., dissenting).
94. Id. at 1808 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
95. Id. at 1809 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
96. Id. (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
97. 450 U.S. 248 (1981).
98. Price Waterhouse, 109 S. Ct. at 1809-10 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
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dine framework. 99 Justice Kennedy contended that the plurality should not
have relied on bona fide occupational qualification and pregnancy accommoda-
tion analogies, because in such cases sex is admittedly the but-for cause of the
employment decision.100 He conceded that Mount Healthy and Transportation
Management were "[c]loser analogies," but found no reason to prefer them over
United States Postal Service Board of Governors v. Aikens 10 1 and Burdine. He
also found unpersuasive Justice O'Connor's analogies to tort cases in which the
defendant's creation of causal uncertainty justifies shifting the burden of
proof.102 He foresaw benefits to few plaintiffs from the new framework and a
likelihood of confusion as lower courts determine which cases call for a shift in
the burden, particularly if the test is applied in jury trials of cases brought under
the Age Discrimination in Employment Act and the Civil Rights Act of 1866.103
He also foresaw problems with suits challenging affirmative action plans, a topic
the plurality said it was not considering at this time.1° 4
Turning to the merits of Ms. Hopkins's own claim, Justice Kennedy stated
that sex stereotyping is not an independent cause of action under Title VII, but
only evidence of discriminatory intent.10 5 He said the record was strong enough
that had the district court found sex discrimination to have caused the adverse
action, it would probably not have committed reversible error.10 6 But because
the district court found neifher that the proffered legitimate reason was pretex-
tual nor that Hopkins would have been promoted in the absence of discrimina-
tion, Justice Kennedy would have remanded for entry of judgment in favor of
Price Waterhouse.
10 7
III. COMMON-LAW APPROACHES TO MIXED MOTIVE CASES
Discrimination cases are hardly unique in their propensity to yield situa-
tions in which violations of the law partially cause events that would have oc-
curred even without the illegal cause. Both tort and contract cases frequently
present such fact patterns. But unlike a discrimination case decided under the
reasoning of any of the opinions in Price Waterhouse, the tort and contract cases
are not dismissed for want of causation. Instead, in these fact patterns closely
analogous to mixed motive discrimination cases, courts impose liability and
award full damages and other relief.
The first few examples are from fields of activity in which conduct driven by
bad motives is tortious, but the same conduct driven by other motives is either
privileged or otherwise not subject to tort liability. In any of those fields, a
99. Id. at 1803 (Kennedy, J., dissenting) (citing United States Postal Serv. Bd. of Governors v.
Aikens, 460 U.S. 711 (1983)).
100. Id. at 1811 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
101. 460 U.S. 711 (1983).
102. Id. (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
103. Id. at 1812-13 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
104. Id. at 1813 n.4 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
105. Id. at 1813 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
106. Id. at 1814 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
107. Id. (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
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defendant may act partly because of a bad motive and partly because of a privi-
leged or neutral one. The question the common law asks before finding liability
and awarding remedies is not whether the defendant would have acted the same
way if the bad motive were absent, but whether the bad motive was dominant
over other motives. In still other cases in which two forces combine to cause
loss, courts apply similar principles in awarding full liability against persons
whose negligent acts or breaches of contract were one of the forces.
A. Intentional Interference with Contractual Relations
The defendant's motivation determines the existence of liability for induc-
ing a breach of contract. A defendant who acts out of whim, spite, or pleasure
in another's ruin may be liable for interference with contractual relations.108 On
the other hand, if the defendant acts reasonably to protect its own economic
interests, the interference may be privileged.' 0 9 If the defendant acts out of a
mixture of bad and privileged motives, courts weigh the motives to find out
which is the dominant cause of the defendant's conduct." 0
An Alaska case, Alyeska Pipeline Service Co. v. Aurora Air Service, Inc.,"'
exemplifies the dominant motive standard. Acting within an existing contract
with a buyer, Alyeska took over transportation serVices that Aurora had been
supplying. That action caused the buyer to terminate its contract with Aurora.
Alyeska said it had an absolute right to take over the services under its contract;
Aurora said that there was no privilege to act unreasonably. The court adopted
the dominant motive test, which had been suggested by Dean Prosser.'1 2 The
court then looked at the competing allegations of motive. Alyeska said it had
economic and safety concerns; Aurora said the motive was simple ill will. The
court said that on the evidence the jury reasonably could have found that the
108. 2 F. HARPER, F. JAMES & 0. GRAY, THE LAW OF TORTS § 6.11, at 347 (2d ed. 1986).
109. Id. at 347-48.
110. W. PROSSER & W. KEETON, supra note 43, § 129, at 984. The Restatement appears to
exhibit some confusion distinguishing between motive and intent. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
TORTS § 766 comment j (1977). It speaks of situations in which the defendant has a "purpose" or
"desire" to do something else but through intentional conduct knowingly interferes with the contrac-
tual relations of the plaintiff. This incidental interference is a tort if unreasonable in its grave harm
to plaintiff's interests and slight benefit to defendant's. Id. Thus, according to the Restatement,
there may be liability if the desire to interfere is "only a casual motive." Id. § 767 comment d,
According to standard legal usage, a person's desire to undertake some immediate activity is an
intention rather than a motive. Motive is instead the underlying goal or inducement. See generally
supra note 16 and accompanying text (describing distinction). The Restatement's ideas about casual
or incidental interference as opposed to interference with the "motive" (properly, the intention) to
interfere correspond to Schnapper's two categories of intention in discrimination cases. See Schnap-
per, supra note 15, at 32. To the extent that the Restatement does address itself to mixed motive, it
establishes liability where Dean Prosser's dominant motive test is met, although it appears also to
opt for liability in some cases where the motive exists but is not dominant. See RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF TORTS, § 766 comment j, at 12 (1977) ("The rule stated in this Section is applied if the
actor acts for the primary purpose of interfering with the performance of the contract, and also if he
desires to interfere, even though he acts for some other purpose in addition."); see also id. comment
r, at 16 ("[T]he freedom to act ... may depend in large measure on the purposes of [the actor's]
conduct. . . . The presence or absence of ill will . . . may clarify the purposes of the actor's
conduct.").
111. 604 P.2d 1090 (Alaska 1979).
112. Id. at 1093.
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motive was ill will. 113 Subsequent cases have applied the test to situations in
which the motives have been more mixed.
1 14
B. Defamation and Malicious Prosecution
A defendant may be privileged to publish otherwise defamatory statements
if its motive is to protect a privileged interest. 1 5 On the other hand, if spite or
ill will motivates the defendant, the privilege is lost. If the motives are mixed,
the law looks to the "primary motive" in imposing or withholding liability. 116
In Nodar v. Galbreath, 117 the Florida Supreme Court reversed a judgment for a
teacher against a parent who asserted a privilege of parental interest.1 18 It ac-
knowledged the evidence of some ill will, but declared: "The incidental gratifi-
cation of personal feelings of indignation is not sufficient to defeat the privilege
where the primary motivation is within the scope of the privilege." 119 Other
cases adopt the same approach. 120 Courts apply similar principles in malicious
prosecution cases.121
113. Id. at 1094. The adoption of the test may have been dicta, for neither party contended that
Alyeska's motives actually were mixed. Aurora said Alyeska's allegation of safety and monetary
concerms was a facade. Id. The dominant motive test itself does not relate to pretext, although it
clearly negates the idea of absolute privilege. Prosser's formulation, quoted by the court, is that any
privilege is lost when the dominant motive is one of ill will; thus in a mixed motive case the trier
should look to whether the dominant motive is the one that is privileged:
[Tihere has been general agreement that a purely "malicious" motive, in the sense of spite
and a desire to do harm to the plaintiff for its own sake, will make the defendant liable for
interference with a contract. The same is true of mere officious intermeddling for no other
reason than a desire to interfere. On the other hand, in the few cases in which the question
has arisen, it has been held that where the defendant has a proper purpose in view, the
addition of ill will toward the plaintiff will not defeat his privilege. It may be suggested
that here, as in the case of mixed motives in the exercise of a privilege in defamation and
malicious prosecution, the court may well look to the predominant purpose underlying the
defendant's conduct.
W. PROSSER & W. KEETON, supra note 43, at 984 (footnotes omitted).
114. Some cases have relied on Alyeska. E.g., Ollice v. Alyeska Pipeline Serv. Co., 659 P.2d
1182 (Alaska 1983); Leigh Furniture & Carpet Co. v. Isom, 657 P.2d 293 (Utah 1982). Other cases
have applied the test without relying on Alyeska. E.g., Hamro v. Shell Oil Co., 674 F.2d 784 (9th
Cir. 1982); Lowell v. Mother's Cake & Cookie Co., 79 Cal. App. 3d 13, 144 Cal. Rptr. 664 (1978).
115. W. PROSSER & W. KEETON, supra note 43, § 115, at 824-25.
116. 2 F. HARPER, F. JAMES & 0. GRAY, supra note 108, § 5.27, at 234; W. PROSSER & W.
KEETON, supra note 43, § 115, at 834. As with intentional interference, the Restatement's approach
is slightly less clear. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 603 comment a (1976) (publication
solely out of spite or ill will not privileged; publication privileged when defendant was motivated by
privileged interest but publication was nevertheless "inspired in part by resentment or indignation").
117. 462 So. 2d 803 (Fla. 1984).
118. Id. at 812.
119. Id. at 811-12.
120. Biggins v. Hanson, 252 Cal. App. 2d 16, 59 Cal. Rptr. 897 (1967); Price v. Conoco, Inc.,
748 P.2d 349 (Colo. App. 1987); Alford v. Georgia Pac. Corp., 331 So. 2d 558 (La. App. 1976);
Schafroth v. Baker, 276 Or. 39, 553 P.2d 1046 (1976).
121. E.g., Nesmith v. Alford, 318 F.2d 110 (5th Cir. 1963), cert. denied, 375 U.S. 975 (1964);
Northwest Fla. Home Health Agency v. Merrill, 469 So. 2d 893 (Fla. App. 1985); see I F. HARPER,
F. JAMES & 0. GRAY, supra note 108, § 4.6, at 443-44; W. PROSSER & W. KEETON, supra note 43,
§ 119, at 883. The Restatement states the test precisely: "To subject a person to liability for mali-
cious prosecution, the proceedings must have been initiated primarily for a purpose other than that
of bringing an offender to justice." RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 668, at 438 (1976). The
court is to balance the motives to see which is dominant:
The phrase "primarily for a purpose other than that of bringing an offender to justice"
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C. Retaliatory Eviction
A tenant may defeat an eviction action brought in retaliation against his
efforts to enforce a housing code. Retaliation is both a defense and a cause of
action for damages. 122 Like mixed motive cases, retaliatory eviction defenses or
claims turn on proof of motivations that frequently are mixed. Although states
vary on the degree of retaliatory motivation needed to support the defense or
claim, the leading standard is that of dominant motive. 123 Some states sustain
the defense when the eviction was motivated even in the slightest part by
retaliation. 
124
D. Concurrent Causation in Unintentional Torts
In many situations, two events occur concurrently and cause an injury, but
either one, acting alone, would have caused the same injury. Without either
event, the injury would have happened anyway. Nevertheless, leaving the victim
without a remedy in those circumstances seems preposterous. Hence tort law
imposes joint and several liability and awards complete recovery from both
causal agents.125 The classic example is Corey v. Havener,126 in which two
motorcycles simultaneously passed too close to a horse, which bolted and
denotes that the person initiating or procuring the criminal proceeding was motivated by
some other purpose that played a more important part in influencing his decision than the
motive of bringing an offender to justice. When there is evidence that the latter motive
played a substantial part in influencing his decision, the determination of whether the ulte-
rior purpose was the primary one is normally for the jury.
Id. comment c, at 439.
122. See Aweeka v. Bonds, 20 Cal. App. 3d 278, 97 Cal. Rptr. 650 (1971) (cause of action);
Morford v. Lensey Corp., 110 Ill. App. 3d 792, 442 N.E.2d 933 (1982) (same).
123. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF PROPERTY: LANDLORD AND TENANT § 14.8, at 49-50
(1976) ("[The landlord is primarily motivated in so acting because the tenant" undertook enforce-
ment.). Three states have codified the primary motivation standard. MICH. Comp. LAWS ANN.
§ 600.5720 (West 1987) ("primarily as a penalty"); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 42-37.1(b) (1988); WAsll.
REV. CODE ANN. § 59.18.240 (West 1988). See generally R. Schoshinski, AMERICAN LAW OF
LANDLORD AND TENANT § 12.11, at 742 (1980) (discussing statutes). Others have adopted it by
common law. Windward Partners v. Delos Santos, 577 P.2d 326 (Hawaii 1978); see Robinson v.
Diamond Hous. Corp., 463 F.2d 853 (D.C. Cir. 1972).
124. E.g., MINN. STAT. ANN. § 566.03 (West 1987) ("intended in whole or in part as a pen-
alty"); see Parkin v. Fitzgerald, 307 Minn. 423, 240 N.W.2d 828 (1976); Silberg v. Lipscomb, 117
N.J. Super. 491, 285 A.2d 86 (1971). Even the few states that require proof of "sole purpose,"
Dickhut v. Norton, 45 Wis. 2d 389, 173 N.W.2d 297 (1970); see Groton Townhouse Apts. v. Cov-
ington, 38 Conn. Supp. 370, 448 A.2d 221 (Conn. Super. Ct. 1982) (construing predecessor of CONN.
GEN. STAT. ANN. § 47a-33 (West Supp. 1988)); Green v. Housing Auth., 164 Ga. App. 205, 296
S.E.2d 758 (1982); Real Estate Servs. v. Barnes, 451 So. 2d 1229 (La. App. 1984), do not go beyond
that standard to ask whether, if the motive had not been present, another motive would have ap-
peared that would have led the landlord to evict anyway. The only state that comes close to using
this approach is Massachusetts, where the statute creates a rebuttable presumption that the land-
lord's eviction is a reprisal for the tenant's filing for or obtaining of legal relief from the landlord's
housing code violation, if the eviction occurs within six months of the tenant's action. The presump-
tion is rebutted only by clear and convincing evidence that the landlord had "sufficient independent
justification for taking such action, and would have in fact taken such action, in the same manner
and at the same time the action was taken," regardless of the tenant's action. MASS. GEN. LAWS
ANN. ch. 186, § 17 (West Supp. 1988). This hypothetical "what would have happened if the motive
had not been present" is the avenue of escape under present mixed motive discrimination doctrine.
125. Restricted to the question of causation alone, and regarded merely as a rule of exclu-
sion, the "but for" rule serves to explain the greater number of cases; but there is one type
of situation in which it fails. If two causes concur to bring about an event, and either one
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harmed the plaintiff. The drivers were held jointly and severally liable, though
each acted independently.1 27 Similar cases abound.1 2 8 Each tortfeasor is liable
for the entirety of the damage, even if the two did not act in concert, despite the
fact that if either had been absent the same harm would have occurred.
1 29
More significant than the concurrent tortfeasor cases, in which the escape
of both defendants seems too obviously unfair, are cases in which an individual's
actions are concurrent with a chance event that independently would have
caused the injury. Even in the latter situation, tort law forces the person com-
mitting the wrong to remedy the entire loss. 13 0 Thus, when a fire set by the
defendant combines with a fire of unknown origin to damage plaintiff's prop-
erty, and either would have been sufficient to do the damage by itself, the de-
fendant is liable for the whole damage.1 3 1 Similarly, when a doctor negligently
treats an ingrown toenail but the patient also suffers from arteriosclerosis, and
gangrene develops, requiring amputation of the patient's foot, the doctor is liable
as long as the negligent treatment was a substantial factor in producing the gan-
grene. 132 It does not matter that the arteriosclerosis alone would have required
the amputation. 133 And when the victim of an industrial accident receives an
injury likely to result in death, but just before he dies, his wife, who is immune
from suit, mistakenly feeds him a poison that would kill a person who was well,
the company responsible for the accident is fully liable for the death.
1 34
of them, operating alone, would have been sufficient to cause the identical result, some
other test is needed.
W. PROSSER & W. KEETON, supra note 43, § 41, at 266-67.
126. 182 Mass. 250, 65 N.E. 69 (1902).
127. Id. at 252, 65 N.E. at 69.
128. E.g., Rozark Farms, Inc. v. Ozark Border Elec. Coop., 849 F.2d 306 (8th Cir. 1988); Glick
v. Ballentine Produce, Inc., 396 S.W.2d 609 (Mo. 1965), appeal dismissed, 385 U.S. 5 (1966); Town
of Sentinel v. Riley, 171 Okla. 533, 43 P.2d 742 (1935); Landers v. East Tex. Salt Water Disposal
Co., 151 Tex. 251, 248 S.W.2d 731 (1952); Johnson v. Chapman, 43 W. Va. 639, 28 S.E. 744 (1897);
see W. PROSSER & W. KEETON, supra note 43, § 41, at 266-67 (citing additional similar cases).
129. Glick, 396 S.W.2d at 612-13; see Chiles v. Rohl, 47 S.D. 580, 201 N.W. 154 (1924). In
Tidal Oil Co. v. Pease, 153 Okla. 137, 5 P.2d 389 (1931), the court permitted recovery for loss of
cattle that had drunk from two streams. The defendants, acting independently, had polluted the
streams, but no evidence revealed from which stream the cattle drank or whether the pollution of
any one defendant was enough to have killed the cattle.
130. If two forces are actively operating, one because of the actor's negligence, the other not
because of any misconduct on his part, and each of itself is sufficient to bring about harm to another,
the actor's negligence may be found to be a substantial factor in bringing it about. RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF TORTS § 432(2), at 430 (1965).
The statement in Subsection (2) applies not only when the second force which is operating
simultaneously with the force set in motion by the defendant's negligence is generated by
the negligent conduct of a third person, but also when it is generated by an innocent act of
a third person or when its origin is unknown.
Id. § 432 comment d, at 431; see Carpenter, Concurrent Causation, 83 U. PA. L. REv. 941, 951
(1935). Although the Restatement phrases its provision in terms of negligence, the same principle
applies to intentional torts. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 870 comment 1, at 286 (1979).
131. Anderson v. Minneapolis, St. Paul & Sault Ste. Marie Ry., 146 Minn. 430, 436, 179 N.W.
45, 48-49 (1920); Kingston v. Chicago & N.W. Ry., 191 Wis. 610, 612, 211 N.W. 913, 914 (1927);
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 432 comment d, illustration 4 (1965) (second fire set by
stroke of lightning or of unknown origin).
132. Kyriss v. State, 707 P.2d 5, 7-8 (Mont. 1985).
133. Id. at 8.
134. Thompson v. Louisville & Nashville R.R., 91 Ala. 496, 499, 8 So. 406, 407 (1890).
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In cases in which the harm is not strictly concurrent, courts also award full
relief, despite the fact that the damage would have occurred without the tortious
act. 135 For example, in Baker v. Willoughby 136 the defendant negligently in-
jured the plaintiff's ankle, causing him some disability. Several years later, but
before the case came to trial, two men shot the plaintiff, forcing doctors to am-
putate the disabled leg. The House of Lords ruled that the second injury did not
diminish the damages for which the defendant was liable. 137
Courts justify those decisions on both theoretical and pragmatic grounds.
They emphasize that the wrongdoer actually caused the harm, and so ought to
be liable no matter what any other factors might have done in the wrongdoer's
absence.13 8 They also emphasize the policy of affording compensation to the
victim, reasoning that between the innocent victim and the wrongdoer whose
conduct was a concurring cause of the loss, the wrongdoer should bear the
loss. 13 9 Like the courts in the common-law mixed motive cases, they do not ask
what hypothetically would have happened." 4° Unlike those courts, however,
they do not require that the defendant who is found liable be responsible for the
dominant cause; the conduct needs only to be a "substantial factor" in bringing
about the harm. 141
E. Concurrent Cause Contract Losses
Just as concurrent cause torts occur, so do concurrent cause breaches of
contract. When both of the sources of raw materials for a product fail to deliver,
each can state truthfully that the loss would have occurred in the absence of its
individual breach. Courts have responded by holding both of the entities
breaching the contract jointly and severally liable for the whole damage. 14 2 The
results in those concurrent cause breach of contract cases thus parallel concur-
rent cause tort cases, 143 and employ identical reasoning. As a matter of policy,
it is absurd to deny the plaintiff a remedy because two or more individuals are
guilty of wrongs that have concurrently caused the same harm. 144 Policy also
justifies holding the defendant liable for the entirety of the harm when an inno-
135. Harwood v. Wyken Colliery Co., 2 K.B. 158 (1913) (awarding full liability for disability
from injury although subsequent heart disease imposed same limits on activity). Contra Dillon v,
Twin State Gas & Elec. Co., 85 N.H. 449, 163 A. 111 (1932) (discussed infra text accompanying
note 250).
136. 1970 A.C. 467.
137. Id. at 492-93.
138. Id.; accord Thompson, 91 Ala. at 501, 8 So. at 408.
139. See Kingston v. Chicago & N.W. Ry., 191 Wis. 610, 618, 211 N.W. 913, 915 (1927).
140. See supra text accompanying notes 108-24.
141. Kyriss v. State, 707 P.2d 5, 8 (Mont. 1985); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 430
comment d, at 428 (1965) ("In order that a negligent actor may be liable for harm resulting to
another from his conduct, it... is not necessary that it be the cause, using the word 'the' as meaning
the sole and even the predominant cause."); see id. § 432(2) & comment d.
142. E.g., Krauss v. Greenbarg, 137 F.2d 569, 572 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 320 U.S. 791 (1943);
Tuttle/White Constructors, Inc. v. Montgomery Elevator Co., 385 So. 2d 98, 100 (Fla. Ct. App.
1980); Hunt v. Ellisor & Tanner, Inc., 739 S.W.2d 933, 938 (Tex. Civ. App. 1987); see D. DOBBS,
HANDBOOK ON THE LAW OF REMEDIES 800 (1973).
143. See supra text accompanying notes 125-41.
144. Bowen v. United States Postal Serv., 459 U.S. 212, 238 (1983) (White, J., dissenting).
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cent cause has combined with the breach of the contract to bring about dam-
age. 14 5 As in the tort cases, the courts apply a "substantial factor" test.
146
F Comparison to Mixed Motive Discrimination Cases
The dominant motive test used in intentional torts cases conflicts with the
tests used in the Price Waterhouse opinions. Even though a motive is dominant,
the harm might have happened without the motive. For example, in Alyeska the
court never asked whether Alyeska would have taken over the services in the
absence of the motive of ill will. The economic and safety motives were still
present; had ill will not been present, those motives may have caused Alyeska to
do precisely what it actually did.14 7 Similarly, in Nodar the court's question was
purely factual, not counterfactual: what did happen, not what would have hap-
pened if. The sole question was whether the primary motive was the unlawful
one.148 Even in the retaliatory eviction cases, courts find in favor of tenants
when retaliation is the landlord's dominant motive, though landlords argue that
they would have taken the action for legitimate objectives. 149
Applying the common law of intentional torts to Price Waterhouse, the
question the court would ask would be whether the employer's dominant motive
in failing to promote the plaintiff was discrimination, that is, sex-based hostility
or a stereotyped view of women. If that motive was dominant, a simultaneous
concern about her relations with subordinates would not matter. The secondary
concern would be as irrelevant as the safety and economic concerns in Alyeska,
even if, as in Alyeska, the defendant might have taken the same action in the
absence of the dominant motive. And, as in Alyeska and the other cases, the
court would order full relief despite the argument that the event would have
happened anyway.
The Price Waterhouse approaches to mixed motive depart from the domi-
nant motive test used in common-law mixed motive tort cases. Under Price
Waterhouse the court asks not whether the hostility to or a stereotyped view of
the employee was the employer's dominant motive. It instead asks whether the
145. See cases cited infra note 146. In a discussion that immediately precedes the issue of multi-
ple causes, Professor Arthur Corbin gave his view of the policies behind remedies for breach of
contract:
The purpose for which courts exist and their remedies are applied is to promote the sur-
vival and prosperity and satisfaction of men. More specifically, the chief purposes for
which the remedy in damages for breach of contract is given are the prevention of similar
breaches in the future and the avoidance of private war. In order that any remedy attain
these ends, the relation between the injury and the breach must be such that men will
foresee a similar sequence of events, that a similar breach is likely to be followed by a
similar injury and a similar remedy.
5 A. CORBIN, CORBIN ON CONTRACTS § 998, at 22 (2d ed. 1964).
146. Momand v. Universal Film Exch., 72 F. Supp. 469, 481-82 (D. Mass. 1947) (Wyzanski, J.)
(dictum); Nelson v. Lake Canal Co., 644 P.2d 55, 59 (Colo. App. 1981); 5 A. CORBIN, supra note
145, § 999 & nn.22-23.
147. See supra notes 111-13 and accompanying text.
148. See supra notes 117-21 and accompanying text.
149. See supra notes 122-24 and accompanying text.
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employer would have done the same thing in the absence of the offending mo-
tive, and finds no liability if the answer is yes.
The common-law mixed motive cases are consistent with the common-law
concurrent cause cases. The motivations of two persons-one racially moti-
vated, one not-making a decision not to hire an employee, can be compared to
the two fires-one wrongfully started, one innocent-that consume the plain-
tiff's building. By extension, the wrongful and innocent causes can be two con-
flicting motivations in a single decision maker's thoughts. The common law of
concurrent causation thus would dictate full relief in the mixed motive cases. To
the extent that the concurrent cause cases require simply a mixture of substan-
tial forces, without requiring that the wrongful one be dominant, they would call
for liability in an even greater range of discrimination cases than would the com-
mon-law mixed motive cases.
G. Commentary on the Comparison to Common-Law Cases
The common-law precedents, however, have not persuaded academic com-
mentators to support full compensation in mixed motive cases. Although the
commentators cite and discuss common-law torts analogous to mixed motive
discrimination cases, they fail to draw the obvious conclusion from the analogy.
Instead of contending that those cases support full relief for the defendant's con-
duct, they stop the analysis short, then ultimately suggest limited remedies such
as nominal damages, cease and desist orders, and damages for emotional harm
associated with discrimination.15 0 Professor Brodin, for example, notes that
when the conduct of two defendants concurs to produce a tort that either alone
would have caused, there is joint and several liability upon a showing that each
cause is a substantial factor. 151 However, he cites this merely as support for the
proposition that courts in tort cases "view 'cause in fact' from a goal-oriented
perspective and to shape it to respond to changing societal needs." 152 He fails to
see that mixed motives are like tortious actors, and that the rule of full relief
might be applied in mixed motive cases as it is in the tort cases.
153
Of course, the commentators' failure to follow the common-law analogy to
its logical conclusion does not answer the question whether an approach based
150. See, eg., Brodin, supra note 12, at 323; see also Stonefield, supra note 13, at 121-22, 139
(rejecting common-law substantial factor test, apparently on the ground that the remedy is inappro-
priate, in favor of but-for test, as applied to dignitary harms, but not to loss of job or other benefit).
151. Brodin, supra note 12, at 315 n.99.
152. Id. at 315.
153. Professor Eaton goes one step further than Brodin. He notes the existence of the rule that
when tortiously caused and innocently caused fires merge to destroy plaintiff's property, the
tortfeasor is liable for the whole damage. Eaton, supra note 13, at 454 & nn.65-66. Looking to
Mount Healthy, the case upon which the plurality and the White concurrence relied, he acknowl-
edges, "Application of these common-law principles to the Mt. Healthy case could produce a differ-
ent result." Id. at 455. But he does not advocate such a result, and although he suggests that Mount
Healthy's result protects governmental functions when applied to constitutional torts, id. at 456-58,
he does not evaluate whether the protection is worth the cost of the misconduct to the victim and
society at large. For a reply to the position Eaton articulates, see infra text accompanying notes 324-
28. See generally infra text accompanying notes 214-22 (discussing the consistency of the commen-
tators' positions with causation theory).
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on that conclusion is superior to the approaches found in Price Waterhouse. To
answer that question, it is necessary to compare the merits of each approach.
IV. COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS OF PRICE WATERHOUSE AND COMMON LAW
APPROACHES TO CAUSATION IN MIXED MOTIVE CASES
To evaluate whether the common-law approach to mixed motive discrimi-
nation-is superior to that of Price Waterhouse, it is necessary to consider the two
issues of causation and remedy. An analysis of the first issue, causation, shows
that the common-law approach is consistent with causal concepts advanced by
philosophers and legal theorists, but the Price Waterhouse approaches are not.
Although academic commentators discussing precursors of Price Waterhouse be-
gin such an analysis, they again fail to draw the obvious conclusion that mixed
motive discrimination is the cause in fact of the firing, refusal to hire, or other
adverse action.
A. Causation Theory
Modem philosophers challenge the entire concept of cause and effect. Ber-
trand Russell contended that the idea of cause is wholly misleading. 154 Human
beings are merely able to observe correlations, the fact that one event follows
another in time. The fact that one event follows another with some regularity
may make predictions about the second event occurring quite accurate, but pre-
diction is not causation. 155
Earlier philosophers were less skeptical.' 5 6 Aristotle had no doubt of cau-
154. B. RUSSELL, On the Notion of Cause (1912), in MYSTICISM AND LOGIC 132 (1981).
155. Even the simplest ideas about cause may be broken down into series of predictions, none of
which is a statement of cause as people customarily use the term. Science, for Russell, is the formu-
lation of laws based on the uniform sequence of events in a nature that is assumed to be uniform. Id.
at 142-43. But these scientific laws are not statements of causation; they are statements of predic-
tion. In a similar vein, R.G. Collingwood has argued that cause and effect has no meaning except in
the highly limited-and for Collingwood somewhat dubious--situation when it refers to the giving
of an inducement to a conscious and responsible individual to make a free and deliberate choice to
do something. Collingwood, On the So-Called Idea of Causation (1938), in FREEDOM AND RESPON-
SIBILITY 303 (H. Morris ed. 1961). C.S. Peirce foreshadowed those assaults on conventional think-
ing with his argument that the acceptance of the certainty of causal relationships implies a
deterministic view of the universe, in which all facts are determined by causal laws. PEIRCE, The
Doctrine of Necessity Examined (1892), in PHILOSOPHICAL WRITINGS OF PEIRCE 324, 324-27 (J.
Buchler ed. 1955). Peirce rejected that view in favor of one in which human will and chance play a
part in events. Id. at 336-38.
156. Moritz Schlick did much to reconcile recent lines of thought with earlier ones by emphasiz-
ing that causation is a matter of human understanding only, not a description of nature that exists
apart from human attempts to impose meaning on experience. Schlick, Causality in Everyday Life
and in Recent Science (1932), in FREEDOM AND RESPONSIBILITY, supra note 155, at 292. The texts
of earlier philosophers indicate some harmony with his approach. Aristotle, whose theory purported
to describe the world rather than human understanding of it, nevertheless characterized cause as the
answer to the human question "why." Aristotle, The Physics (Book 2), in I ARISTOTLE, THE COM-
PLETE WORKS 329, 338 (J. Barnes ed. 1984). Hume was more explicit, stating that the opinion that
every object owes its existence to a cause derives not from the certainty of knowledge or scientific
reasoning, but from rough human observations. D. HUME, A TREATISE OF HUMAN NATURE 82 (J.
Selby-Bigge ed. 1888) (reprinted 1964). "Upon the whole, necessity is something that exists in the
mind, not in the objects." Id. at 165. Following Russell, Schlick conceded that the human under-
standing of cause has at its base a network of predictions, but he contended that humans can rely on
those predictions quite adequately in everyday pursuits. Schlick, supra, at 300-02. Other writers,
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sation's reality, though he did not analyze it in terms of but-for relationships. 15
7
David Hume argued that causation is beyond direct human perception, 158 but
still can be said to depend on the contiguity of objects in a causal chain, with the
cause preceding the effect in time. 159 In general, Hume did not pose the
counterfactual and ask if the effect could exist without the presence of the sup-
posed cause. 160 Instead, he simply reasoned that a supposed cause is not a causq
if it is not uniformly followed by the effect within the observer's experience. 161
John Stuart Mill recognized that multiple causes may act together. He de-
fined cause as the totality of the conditions that invariably lead to the effect.
162
He denied that causal laws could identify a dominant or chief cause among the
various causal conditions. 163 At times he employed a but-for test. 164 Still, he
also spoke of the "conjunction of several" causes leading to a phenomenon,
without requiring a but-for relationship between the effect and any one of the
conjoined causes.165 Thus the necessity, that is, the invariability, of the cause
and effect relationship does not depend on the but-for test.
nevertheless, have disputed Schlick's approach, contending that causation is a phenomenon of the
universe and its own workings, not a human construct that lacks ontological significance. Eg., J.
MACKIE, THE CEMENT OF THE UNIVERSE 2 (1974).
157. He believed there are four types of causal relationships: matter (bricks cause houses or
letters cause syllables); form (a triangle of a given shape causes certain measurements or a seed
causes a tree); primary source of change or rest; and "for the sake of which," a relationship which
may be reduced to the form category. Aristotle, supra note 156, at 338. Most relevant for present
purposes, he believed that chance and spontaneous action of natural objects or animals, although
they could be the source of change or rest, are distinct from causes that fall under the form category,
that is, activity that occurs to fulfill some purpose or archetype. Id. at 336-37. Tie latter activity he
characterized as being regular or nearly regular. Id. at 335. This relationship of regularity suggests
a but-for relationship, but his qualification that such causal relationships need not happen every
time, and his recognition of chance as having causal properties suggest that his theory may accom-
modate the idea that any contribution to causation is causation in fact.
158. D. HUME, supra note 156, at 74.
159. Id. at 75-76. Even if those conditions apply, there is still no causation without a necessary
connection between the cause and the effect. Id. at 77. Nevertheless, such a necessity can never be
known to the point of certainty; causal understanding hinges on human guesswork that the universe
is uniform, and that the course of nature continues always the same. Id. at 82, 87-89.
160. In discussing rules to judge the cause and effect, Hume did note the maxim, "The same
cause always produces the same effect, and the same effect never arises but from the same cause."
Id. at 173. But it appears that he was speaking of categories of causes and effects, that is, types of
events, rather than of the cause and effect relationship between particular events. In an adjacent
passage, he spoke of the situation in which "several different objects produce the same effect," id. at
174, an impossibility if the effect never occurred in the absence of the cause. He also entertained the
idea that causes might need to be "assisted" by other causes. Id. at 174-75. Each such "not corn-
pleat" cause would of course fail all aspects of the necessity test in the absence of the assisting cause.
161. See id. at 91. Hume further allowed that contrary causes may disrupt the operation of
causation, and thus that humans may perceive an absence of necessity in the relation of cause and
effect. Id. at 132. Hume viewed chance as the negation of cause where it may be said to operate, but
not as a threat to the general idea of causation. Id. at 125.
162. J.S. MILL, A SYSTEM OF LOGIC Bk. III, ch. 5, § 3, at 217 (1850) ("The cause, then, philo-
sophically speaking,' is the sum total of the conditions, positive and negative, taken together; the
whole of the contingencies of every description, which being realized, the consequent inevitably
follows.").
163. Id. ch. 5, § 3, at 215.
164. E.g., id. ch. 5, § 6, at 222 ("That which will be followed by a given consequent when, and
only when, some third circumstance also exists, is not the cause, even although no case should ever
have occurred in which the phenomenon took place without it."); id. ch. 8, § 2. But see id. ch, 10,
§ 2, at 286 (characterizing the method of agreement, a form of the but-for test, as "uncertain").
165. Id. ch. 10, § 7; ch. 6, § 1; ch. 10, § 7.
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Legal sources discussing causation have used several approaches. Some
commentators have spoken of causation as an essential, but undefinable, phe-
nomenon like color.16 6 Others have spoken of causation as something that can
be understood by reference to a set of common-sense rules
1 6 7 or paradigms.1 6 8
The most significant recent development in legal thinking about cause is the
application of probability ideas. A probabilistic account of causation must deal
with the absence of a but-for relationship in events. To use Professor Schauer's
example, tobacco smoking causes lung cancer even though lung cancer might
occur in a person who does not smoke. 169 The cause increases the incidence of
the effect in repeated trials, with other variables controlled to the extent possi-
ble. 170 Though the relationship is causal, it is not one of but-for causation.171
The vast majority of legal sources rely on philosophers' arguments to con-
clude that any causal factor that contributes to a harmful decision is a cause-in-
fact of the full harm. Thus, Professor Epstein discards the but-for test when
discussing causal paradigms, and acknowledges that one of several forces is still
a cause.172 In doing so he echoes Professor Jeremiah Smith, who, writing near
the turn of the century, rejected the but-for test for causation in cases in which
two or more tortious causes combine to produce an effect. 17 3 Professors H.L.A.
Hart and Tony Honore emphasize that this reasoning applies directly to mixed
motive employment discrimination cases: the discrimination causes the adverse
action. 174
Applying these ideas to Price Waterhouse, one would say that the discrimi-
nation caused the adverse employment action, just as in Corey v. Havener each
166. A. BECHT & F. MILLER, THE TEST OF FACTUAL CAUSATION IN NEGLIGENCE AND
STRICT LIABILITY 5 (1961).
167. H. HART & T. HONORE, CAUSATION IN THE LAW 26 (2d ed. 1985).
168. Epstein, A Theory of Strict Liability, 2 J. LEGAL STUD. 151, 166 (1973).
169. Schauer, Causation Theory and the Causes of Sexual Violence, 1987 AM. B. FOUND. RES. J.
737, 753.
170. Id. Schauer concedes that such relationships are not known as a matter of certainty, but
notes that humans constantly use hypotheses that are not known, or even knowable, to the point of
certainty. Id. at 759-60. Peirce emphasized that any induction, presumably even of a causal law in a
case in which observation shows a perfect regularity of occurrence, is not known to the point of
certainty, because no one can observe future occurrences. Peirce, The General Theory of Probable
Inference (1883), in C. PEIRCE, supra note 155, at 199. Professor Rizzo notes that the same evidence
may reflect either truly probabilistic causation (at some measurable rate, the consequence sometimes
happens) or causation that is simply unknown (at some measurable rate, there is an unknown factor
that will yield the consequence whenever the unknown factor is there). Rizzo, Foreword: Funda-
mentals of Causation, 63 CHI.[-]KENT L. REV. 397, 403 (1987).
171. For further discussion of these concepts in the context of apportionment of causal responsi-
bility, see infra text accompanying notes 259-65.
172. Epstein, supra note 168, at 168 (discussing "force" paradigm of causation and discarding
but-for test).
173. Smith, Legal Cause in Actions of Tort, 25 HARv. L. REv. 103, 109 n.109 (1911) (referring
to case of two or more tortious causes combining as exception to but-for test); see Wright, supra note
22, at 1797; cf J. MACKIE, supra note 156, at 44-47 (philosophical basis of legal theory). Contra
Peaslee, Multiple Causation and Damage, 47 HARV. L. REV. 1127, 1134-41 (1934).
174. H. HART & T. HONORE, supra note 167, at 194. They maintain, nonetheless, that liability
should be withheld despite the causal relationship on policy grounds embodied in the underlying
statutes. See generally infra text accompanying notes 298-318 (discussing policies relating to reme-
dies under Title VII).
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motorcycle caused the collision. 175 The causal relation of the motive or the mo-
torcycle to the harm remains true even if something else was acting and would
have been equally effective in the wrongful force's absence. 176 The but-for test
yields a different result, but the but-for test is just an analytical aid, not an abso-
lute for a finding of causation. 177
Many legal theorists have stressed further that causation, in law and else-
where, is a functional concept. What the law identifies as a cause depends upon
why the law is doing the identifying.1 78 The functional approach suggests that if
a causal test identifies the category of actors for whom policy dictates liability
and relief, the law should employ that test. But even the most prominent among
functionalism's current detractors make no objection on the ground of factual
causation to assigning liability to any of the forces that constitute the cause of a
harm. 179 Nonfunctionalist ideas of causation embrace concurrent cause cases in
which the but-for test would not be satisfied.180
The unifying factor between mixed motive discrimination cases and com-
mon-law mixed motive and multiple cause cases is the reality of causation of an
event, even when two causal factors combine, and even when one factor would
have caused the event by itself.181 To apply the philosophers' and legal writers'
175. See supra notes 125-27 and accompanying text.
176. Green, The Causal Relation Issue in Negligence Law, 60 MICH. L. REv. 543, 556 (1962)
("A defendant's conduct may contribute to the victim's injury even though there are other causal
factors that would have caused the same or similar injury to the victim.").
177. The criminal law, following the approach of the Restatement of Torts, establishes liability
based on an offender's actions being the substantial cause, even when other noncriminal forces also
cause the harm. W. LAFAVE & A. Scor, CRIMINAL LAW § 312(c) (2d ed. 1986) (citing cases),
178. E.g., Borgo, Causal Paradigms in Tort Law, 8 J. LEGAL STUD. 419, 439 (1979); Calabresi,
Concerning Cause and the Law of Torts, 43 U. CHI. L. REv. 69, 106 (1975); Landes & Posner,
Causation in Tort Law: An Economic Approach, 12 J. LEGAL STUD. 109, 110 (1983); Malone, Rumi-
nations on Cause in Fact, 9 STAN. L. REv. 60, 61-63 (1956); Weinrib, A Step Forward in Factual
Causation, 38 MOD. L. REv. 518, 530 (1975). Contra Weinrib, Causation and Wrongdoing, 63
CHI.[-]KENT L. REV. 407, 409 (1987) [hereinafter, Weinrib, Causation and Wrongdoing]. Dean
Calabresi, in a forceful exposition, contends that "in law the term 'cause' is used in different guises
but always to identify those pressure points that are most amenable to the social goals we wish to
accomplish." Calabresi, supra, at 106 (emphasis in original). Despite Hart and Honore's apparent
use of such an approach in some instances, eg., H. HART & T. HONORE, supra note 167, at 11-12,
63, they criticize it for, among other things, failing to account for cases in which something that
cannot be changed is called the cause, id. at 33-37. This misses the point, In those cases, it is of
significance to the legal system that the something that it cannot change "caused" the harm, because
then the legal system can be secure that it does not need to do anything. Stated another way, the
legal system's location of the cause somewhere where liability rules do not matter is highly func-
tional to the business of assigning or withholding liability.
In line with Hume, the functional approach puts the emphasis on human understanding and its
attempts to deal with the problem at hand. Nevertheless, few of the legal writers who use a func-
tional approach would go as far as Russell in denying the existence of causation altogether. See A.
BECHT & F. MILLER, supra note 166, at 21. Though they fail to discuss the matter in as straightfor-
ward a fashion as Mackie or Schlick, Hart and Honore appear to reject the idea that causation exists
only in the human understanding. They do, nevertheless, apply concepts of legal causation that
select causes based on common-sense ideas related to the objectives of the legal system.
179. See Epstein, supra note 168, at 160-61; Wright, supra note 22, at 1782-83.
180. Wright, supra note 22, at 1791.
181. Not only does the common law follow the philosophers' view that any cause of the harm is
the cause in fact, the law goes considerably further to impose liability and award relief in some cases
in which there is no causal connection whatever between the defendant's wrongful conduct and the
plaintiff's injury. In those cases, liability is imposed on the defendant for policy reasons alone. The
cases underscore the adequacy of the causal showing in mixed motive discrimination cases, and they
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insights on causation to the discrimination cases, if the court finds that the em-
ployer actually considered race, sex, or another prohibited factor, discrimination
caused the result. The court should impose liability and full relief to correct that
result. 182 The analogy to the common law cases requires that full damages be
suggest that even if that'showing were deemed inadequate, full relief might still be imposed on policy
grounds.
The first class of cases is "public purposes" torts, cases in which public officials interfere with
voting, invade privacy, falsely imprison, or otherwise infringe important rights. The courts award
general damages for the presumed, but unproven, harm caused by the conduct. Doubts about the
validity of such presumptions have led one commentator to conclude that courts really permit the
large awards because of "public law purposes": the verdicts "often operate to enforce limits upon
the official or unofficial power of persons in authority and to preserve rights of the public generally to
be free of oppressive conduct." D. DOBBS, supra note 142, at 531. The passage continues: "It may
well be that substantial damages are permitted in these cases partly in recognition that such public
purposes are being served rather than in any belief that a person falsely arrested has suffered humili-
ation worth $100,000." Id. In Memphis Community School Dist. v. Stachura, 477 U.S. 299 (1986),
a case that involved the suspension of a tenured teacher, without hearing, on account of inaccurate
rumors about his curricular choices in teaching about human reproduction, the Supreme Court in-
sisted that compensation of actual damage is the only legitimate purpose of any award that is not
explicitly an award of punitive damages. Id. at 306-10. Though the Court held that Stachura's loss
of the right to a hearing and the right to free speech did not require presumed damages as a "rough
substitute for compensatory damages," it reaffirmed the use of presumed damages in defamation and
voting cases. Id. at 310-11 & n.14. As long as disproportionately large presumed damages awards
survive, they serve as examples of significant monetary relief without proof of any causation of the
loss.
Second, there are private law tort cases in which there is effectively no causation requirement
for the award of a remedy. Courts have so relaxed the causation requirement in product liability
actions over injuries from dangerous goods that lack adequate labels that a prominent commentator
has declared that the causation requirement no longer exists in such cases. Schwartz, Causation in
Private Tort Law: A Comment on Kelman, 63 CHI.[-]KENT L. REv. 639, 644 (1987). As a means of
encouraging manufacturers to give adequate warnings, the courts impose relief even though plaintiffs
cannot prove they would have read the labels. Id. (citing cases). Other examples of tort liability
without causation are: respondeat superior, Towns v. Yellow Cab Co., 22 InI. 2d 113, 382 N.E.2d
1217 (1978); Hinman v. Westinghouse Elec. Co., 2 Cal. 3d 956, 471 P.2d 988, 88 Cal. Rptr. 188
(1970); premises liability, RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 520C (1977); and strict liability,
Liberty Mut. Ins. Co. v. Williams Mach. & Tool Co., 62 Ill. 2d 77, 338 N.E.2d 857 (1975). Of
course, in each of these cases there is a causal connection between the defendant and the harm, but
there is no causal connection between any wrongdoing by the defendant and the harm.
Damages are awarded without any proof of causation in a third category of cases: contract
actions in which courts award general and liquidated damages without a showing of causation. One
distinguished commentator has noted that artificial "general damages" rules compel courts to award
significant damages irrespective of a lack of actual harm flowing from defendant's conduct. D.
DOBBS, supra note 142, at 798. Policy reasons justify such results: "Under general damages formu-
lae we can justify giving the plaintiff recovery for a loss he may not in fact have had, on the ground
that it is an administrative device, like a liquidated damage clause, to save the highly individualized
calculation in difficult cases." Id. at 799. With liquidated damages clauses, the same policy gives
rise to the same result. See Stephens v. Essex County Park Comm'n, 143 F. 844 (3d Cir. 1906).
A fourth category of liability without causation, restitutionary awards may be made even when
the defendant has not caused plaintiff any loss compensable under ordinary damages rules. D. LAY-
COCK, MODERN AMERICAN REMEDIES 463 (1985). Willful infringements of established rights that
enable the defendant to make a profit are, as a matter of policy, to be discouraged. See id.
The particular factors that lead courts to award damages in these four categories of cases may
or may not be present in mixed motive cases. But the cases cap the argument that but for causation
is not an ironclad requirement for liability and relief.
182. Causal skeptics-legal writers Professors Landes and Posner and Professor Kelman, fol-
lowing philosophers Russell and Collingwood-have such doubts about causation generally that
they applaud the imposition of relief, under proper circumstances, without any showing of causation
at all. Landes & Posner, supra note 178, at 110; see Kelman, The Necessary Myth of Objective
Causation Judgments in Liberal Political Theory, 63 CH.[-]KENT L. REv. 579, 633 (1987). See
generally supra note 181 (discussing liability without causation). A generation ago, Professor Clar-
ence Morris argued that causation-of any type-is not absolutely necessary for liability, and that
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awarded even when the individual would not have been hired, or would have
been fired, for other reasons. The point is that the employee was not hired, or
was fired, because of this reason.
B. The Weakness-and Strength-of the Approaches Advanced in Price
Waterhouse
The Price Waterhouse plurality's rejection of but-for causation was correct.
Consistent with the philosophers,183 the legal writers,' 8 4 and the common law of
torts and contracts, 185 the plurality recognized that contribution to an event's
occurrence is causation of it.' 86 As Hart and Honore wrote in their discussion
of the Mount Healthy case, if a discriminatory motive contributes to an employ-
ment decision, it causes it.18 7 If the court withholds liability in such a situation,
that decision rests on policy grounds, not lack of causation.1 88
The Price Waterhouse plurality stumbled, however, when it concluded that
the employer is not liable if it would have made the same decision anyway.'
8 9
To reach the conclusion, Justice Brennan had to invent a management preroga-
tive exception for mixed motive cases brought under Title VII. There is simply
no basis for such an exception.190 Congress was solicitous of management pre-
rogatives, but it embodied its solicitude in the terms of the statute itself, in such
provisions as the one allowing discrimination in cases of bona fide occupational
qualification (BFOQ). Nothing more can be made of the BFOQ provision. ,'
the focus should be off causation and on the issue of blame. "In these multiple cause cases, the
notion that actual causation is prerequisite to liability is a misleading nuisance. The central problem
is: should the defendant be held to blamefor the injury, even though, in some sense, causal connec-
tion may in fact be lacking?" Morris, Duty, Negligence and Causation, 101 U. PA. L. REV. 189, 212
(1952). By "blame," Morris meant a connection with the injury, even if not strictly causal, sufficient
that imposition of damages furthers the law's purposes. Id.; see Pedrick, Causation, the "Who Done
It" Issue, and Arno Becht, 1978 WASH. U.L.Q. 645, 654.
Whether the law should dispense with a showing of causation in employment discrimination
cases depends upon the importance of the policies that such an approach would advance, the possi-
bility of accomplishing those policies by other means, and the significance of any countervailing
policies that such an approach would frustrate. These policies are taken up below in the discussion
of remedial policy. See infra text accompanying notes 223-328. The approach to mixed motive
discrimination advanced in this Article does not require the abandonment of the causation require-
ment. But even if it did, the proposed approach would still be justified, as long as policy considera-
tions support full relief in the cases to which it applies.
183. See supra notes 154-65 and accompanying text.
184. See supra notes 166-82 and accompanying text.
185. See supra notes 125-46 and accompanying text.
186. Justice Brennan's example of combining physical forces is unanswerable, Price Waterhouse,
109 S. Ct. at 1786, and the concurrers and dissenters barely try to answer it. Id. at 1795-96 (White,
J., concurring), 1797 (O'Connor, J., concurring), 1808 n.2 (Kennedy, J., dissenting). Even Justice
Kennedy's failed attempt to do so is revealing. Rather than challenge whether the two forces are in
fact causes, he simply says that such a test for liability is inconsistent with Justice Brennan's ultimate
position that there is no liability when the employer proves it would have made the decision anyway.
Price Waterhouse, 109 S. Ct. at 1808 n.2 (Kennedy, J., dissenting). Both Justice Kennedy and Jus-
tice Brennan are right. There is causation, and liability should exist.
187. H. HART & T. HONORE, supra note 167, at 194.
188. Id. at 194.
189. Price Waterhouse, 109 S. Ct. at 1795.
190. Id. at 1808-09 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
191. But see id. at 1786 (plurality opinion).
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As the plurality noted, legislative history preserves "the employer's right to in-
sist that any prospective applicant, Negro or white, must meet applicable job
qualifications," and says that any nonforbidden "criterion or qualification for
employment is not affected" by the statute. But liability for employers in mixed
motive cases does not force them to hire anyone without qualifications. It
merely forces them to answer for failing to hire someone on the basis, in part, of
unlawful discrimination. Even if full remedies for violations can include orders
to hire or reinstate, the doctrine of undue hardship would protect a guilty em-
ployer against hiring someone incapable of doing the job.192
Liability for discrimination under the statute has no implicit exceptions.
Justice Kennedy emphasized: "Title VII unambiguously states that an employer
who makes decisions"because of' sex has violated the statute." 193 Any affirma-
tive defense that the adverse action would have taken place anyway is "not
found in the language or legislative history of Title VII.
' ' 194
Justice O'Connor and Justice Kennedy tried to avoid the dilemma of the
plurality by saying that Congress imposed a but-for causal test for Title VII
liability. 195 But apart from the stray comments about but-for causation that
could be found in discussion of any statutory or common law liability, the legis-
lative history has nothing to suggest that Congress intended to do so.196 None
of the comments address multiple causation. Congress's only recognition of
multiple causation was in its rejection of an amendment to section 70 6(g) of the
Act that would have required discrimination to be the sole cause of adverse
action in cases in which the court awards reinstatement and back pay. 197 The
rejection of the amendment indicates that Congress did not adopt a but-for
test.198
Justice O'Connor was not wrong but irrelevant in referring to cases in
which courts shift the burden of proof because the defendant's wrongdoing leads
to causal uncertainty. Cases of that type are not necessarily multiple causation
cases. For example, in Summers v. Tice, 199 the first such case Justice O'Connor
cites,2°° two hunters, using identical shot, negligently discharged their rifles in
plaintiff's direction. One hit plaintiff's eye.20 1 That was not a case of multiple
causes, but one of true causal uncertainty. One hunter alone caused the harm,
but there was no way to tell which one. The court in effect established multiple
liability for single causation by shifting the burden of proof to each of the
192. See infra text accompanying notes 322-26.
193. Price Waterhouse, 109 S. Ct. at 1809 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
194. Id. (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
195. Id. at 1797 (O'Connor, J., concurring); id. at 1807 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
196. Many authorities speak generally of the need for but-for causation to establish liability, but
nevertheless treat multiple causation paradigms differently. E.g., W. PROSSER & W. KEETON, supra
note 43, § 41, at.265-68.
197. See Vaas, Title VII Legislative History, 7 B.C. INDUS. & COMM. L. REV. 431, 456 (1966).
198. Price Waterhouse, 109 S. Ct. at 1785 & n.7 (plurality opinion).
199. 33 Cal. 2d 80, 199 P.2d 1 (1948).
200. Price Waterhouse, 109 S. Ct. at 1797 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
201. Summers, 33 Cal. 2d at 82, 199 P.2d at 1.
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hunters to show that it was not his pellet that hit plaintiff.20 2
Multiple causation can create genuine uncertainty whether a given factor
contributed to the harm. But in those multiple causation cases the burden that
courts shift is not that of showing that the same event would have happened
anyway. Instead, as Justice O'Connor herself quoted from Wigmore, it is "the
burden of proving that the other person, or his other act, was the sole cause of
the harm.' '203 If the other factor was the sole cause, there is no liability. If both
factors contributed, both wrongdoers are liable.
In multiple causation paradigms a but-for causal test is wrong both in logic
and in law. Such a test does support the outcome in Price Waterhouse without
the creation of a new management prerogative exception to Title VII, but if that
is a virtue it is its solitary one.
Justice White's concurrence attempted to mask the inconsistency of the rea-
soning in the case with the unexplained citation of precedent. "In my view, to
determine the proper approach to causation in this case, we need look only to
the Court's opinion in Mt. Healthy.. : ."204 But Mount Healthy suffers from the
same defective reasoning as Price Waterhouse; the brevity of its exposition
merely conceals its illogic. In Mount Healthy, a school board fired a teacher on
the basis of activity protected under the first amendment: the teacher's unau-
thorized disclosure of a new teacher dress code to a radio station.205 But the
employer's statement of reasons for its refusal to renew the teacher's contract
listed both that incident and another one involving the teacher's use of rude
gestures in the cafeteria. 20 6 Moreover, the statement also contained a general
assertion that the teacher displayed "a notable lack of tact in handling profes-
sional matters,"'207 which may have been a reference to yet another incident, one
involving a physical confrontation and running argument with a coworker.208
The district court found that the teacher's exercise of first amendment rights
"played a substantial part in the decision not to renew" the employment con-
tract, but acknowledged that the other, legitimate reasons also played a part.
209
The Supreme Court opinion in Mount Healthy discussed the selection of an
appropriate rule of causation in such a case:
A rule of causation which focuses solely on whether protected conduct
played a part, "substantial" or otherwise, in a decision not to rehire,
could place the employee in a better position as a result of the exercise
of constitutionally protected conduct than he would have occupied had
he done nothing.2
10
202. Id. at 86, 199 P.2d at 4.
203. Price Waterhouse, 109 S. Ct. at 1798 (O'Connor, J., concurring) (emphasis added) (quoting
2 J. WIGMORE, SELECT CASES ON THE LAW OF TORTS § 153, at 865 (1912)).
204. Id. at 1795 (White, J., concurring).
205. Mount Healthy City School Dist. Bd. of Educ. v. Doyle, 429 U.S. 274, 281-83 (1977).
206. Id. at 283.
207. Id. at 283 n.1.
208. See d. at 281-83.
209. Id. at 284-85. For additional comments on Mount Healthy, see infra note 221 and accom-
panying text.
210. Mount Healthy, 429 U.S. at 285.
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According to the Court, if the employer "would have reached that decision had
not the constitutionally protected incident ... occurred," the decision not to
renew employment would not "necessarily amount to a ... violation justifying
remedial action." 2 11 Although the Court's phrasing is ambiguous, that language
seems to require dismissal if the complained-of event would have occurred
anyway.21
2
The gist of the reasoning is that following the ordinary rules of causation
yields a result the Court does not like. The Court's argument thus sounds in
remedy, not causation. Part V of this Article takes up the argument of Mount
Healthy and various commentators that granting relief in cases in which the
adverse action would have occurred anyway is disproportionate or otherwise
disadvantageous.
2 13
C. The Position of the Commentators
Authorities on mixed motive discrimination apply the correct causation
rules to mixed motive discrimination cases. Nevertheless, they fail to draw the
conclusion that the discrimination causes the entirety of the adverse action.
Although they generally advocate imposition of liability even when the employer
would have made the same decision on other grounds, they nevertheless argue
that the but-for causal test should bar reinstatement and back pay. Professor
Brodin attacks the but-for causal test, saying that it ignores statutory policy and
is impractical. 214 He even emphasizes that causation rules always respond to
policy concerns. 2 15 But he would defy his own causal analysis by applying the
but-for test to deny victims of mixed motive discrimination back pay and
reinstatement.
216
Professor Stonefield criticizes the but-for causal test on similar grounds, but
nevertheless concludes that it ought to be used to deny back pay and reinstate-
ment in mixed motive cases.2 17 He would permit damages for emotional distress
in cases in which discrimination is the cause in a but-for sense, but he would
deny back pay and hiring relief because the loss of the job would have occurred
anyway.2 18 Professor Belton in a recent article recites authorities rejecting the
but-for test,219 but still advocates imposition of such a test on individual dispa-
211. Id. The Court's peculiar phrasing left unclear whether any liability attaches to the em-
ployer's conduct, or whether no remedy is appropriate under the circumstances. See infra note 221.
212. Mount Healthy, 429 U.S. at 285. Differing interpretations of the language led to the diver-
sity of results in mixed motive Title VII cases prior to the opinion in Price Waterhouse. See infra
note 221 and accompanying text.
213. See infra text accompanying notes 223-328.
214. Brodin, supra note 12, at 317-22.
215. For example, he discusses the rule that a ship operator is liable for an overboard seaman's
death if the operator fails to throw a line, no matter how remote the chances of the seaman's rescue.
Id. at 318 n.1l0.
216. Id. at 323-25. Brodin's approach fares no better as a remedial test. See infra text accompa-
nying note 229. Brodin hints at the remedial issue, but does not discuss it in detail. See Brodin,
supra note 12, at 324-25 n.130.
217. Stonefield, supra note 13, at 120-22.
218. Id. at 120-28.
219. Belton, supra note 14, at 1248 nn.53-55. Belton even states that a "strong argument can be
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rate treatment cases involving mixed motives. 220
Remedy, not causation, is the only possible basis for the position of these
sophisticated observers.221 Brodin, echoing Mount Healthy, says that "back pay
and reinstatement [would] place the plaintiff in a better position than he would
have been in had the violation not occurred. ' 222 A discussion of remedial policy
will demonstrate that Brodin's concern is unwarranted.
V. THE ISSUE OF REMEDY IN MIXED MOTIVE CASES
To evaluate the superiority of the common-law approach to mixed motive
discrimination cases, it is necessary to consider remedial goals. Remedial goals
in mixed motive cases should be the same as those in all cases: compensa-
tion;22 3 deterrence of wrongdoers; 224 reinforcement of the community's sense
of justice and prevention of dangerous self-help solutions;2 25 and furtherance of
statutory policies. Pursuit of these goals should be tempered by considerations
of practicality.226 Further examination of the issues demonstrates that full relief
serves those objectives within the limits of practicality in mixed motive discrimi-
nation cases.
A. Compensation
Compensation demands that the party whose discrimination causes harm
pay for the total harm, despite a mixed legitimate cause. Although arguments
based on contributory fault, valuation, and probabilistic apportionment chal-
lenge that conclusion, those challenges do not hold up.
1. Compensation and Causation
A careful analysis of causation reveals that in mixed motive cases, the dis-
made that causal analysis should not be as critical an element in employment discrimination law as it
is in the law of negligence." Id. at 1242.
220. Id. at 1299.
221. Perhaps, despite the Court's use of the word "causation," this is what the Mount Healthy
Court had in mind all along. The Court never denied that the intention to punish for the assertion of
constitutional rights caused the discharge. Instead, it went on at length about how disadvantageous
it would be to grant a remedy for the discharge that the intention to penalize caused. Mount
Healthy School Dist. Bd. of Educ. v. Doyle, 429 U.S. 274, 284-87 (1977). The Court seemed to
recognize its remedial orientation with this sentence: "The constitutional principle at stake is suffi-
ciently vindicated if such an employee is placed in no worse a position than if he had not engaged in
the [protected] conduct." Id. at 285-86. The Court buttressed its position with analogies to criminal
procedure cases in which the Court found constitutional violations by the police not to justify the
remedy of suppressing evidence. Id. at 286-87.
Most commentators have analyzed Mount Healthy not as a case lacking proof of causation, but
as a case in which the Court applied remedial policy ideas to limit relief that otherwise would be
justified by the harm the defendant actually caused. H. HART & T. HONORE, supra note 167, at 194;
Brodin, supra note 12, at 325; Stonefield, supra note 13, at 165; Wolly, supra note 13, at 392.
222. Brodin, supra note 12, at 325; see Note, Mixed-Motive Smokescreen, supra note 13, at 874
n.68.
223. See D. LAYcoCK, supra note 181, at 2.
224. See R. POSNER, ECONOMIc ANALYSIS OF THE LAW 243 (3d ed. 1986).
225. 5 A. CORBIN, supra note 145, § 1002, at 33.
226. D. DOBBS, supra note 142, at 4-5.
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crimination does cause the plaintiff's harm. 227 Even the narrowest idea of com-
pensation at least would make wrongdoers pay victims for the harms they cause
them. Thus wrongdoers in mixed motive cases should be made to hire and give
back pay.228 Brodin is therefore incorrect when he suggests that reinstatement
or back pay overcompensates.2 29 Stonefield, too, errs in contending that failure
to apply a but-for test punishes the discriminator for a mere state of mind.
230
Awarding full relief merely compensates for the harm the wrongdoer caused.
Justice Robert Peaslee of the New Hampshire Supreme Court contended in
a 1934 article about negligence231 that the but-for test ought to be an absolute
standard for both causation and compensation: When the conduct of a single
tortfeasor combines with natural or other innocent causes and results in injury,
the defendant's conduct has not enhanced the loss, and any judgment against the
defendant is a windfall; the wrongful conduct, though it may be the cause of an
event, is not a cause of the loss. 23
2
A year later, Professor Carpenter responded to Justice Peaslee.2 33 He ar-
gued that the but-for test had no magical power for determining either cause or
compensation. The causal question must be determined by reference to what
actually did happen, not what would have happened under different circum-
stances. 234 After that threshold of causation is established, compensation be-
comes a question of remedial policy. The relevant policy is to compensate the
innocent victim of wrongful conduct, and not to permit wrongdoers to escape
actual consequences of wrongful acts. 235
As a matter of both logic and policy, Carpenter is correct. Evidence of the
weakness of Justice Peaslee's position is that even he would award full compen-
sation when the wrongful conduct of two tortfeasors combines to cause the
227. See supra text accompanying notes 172-82.
228. Hiring and back pay are the ordinary remedies in Title VII cases.
229. Stonefield makes an equivalent statement, which falls to the same argument. See
Stonefield, supra note 13, at 139.
230. See id. at 170-72. Justice O'Connor takes the same position in her concurrence in Price
Waterhouse, 109 S. Ct. at 1797 (O'Connor, J., concurring). The discriminator is not being punished,
but merely forced to make whole the harm it has brought about. In multiple causation cases, it is
incorrect to equate compensation with merely placing someone in the position that person would
have occupied had there been no discrimination. Moreover, the law often totally disregards causa-
tion in requiring a wrongdoer to compensate an injured party. See supra text accompanying note
181.
231. Peaslee, supra note 173, at 1133-41.
232. Id. at 1130.
233. Carpenter, supra note 130.
234. Id. at 948. In ordinary experience, a cause that combines with another cause is considered
to have resulted in an event, even though one would have been sufficient in the other's absence.
Carpenter's example is that if three people all push a car off a cliff, all three have caused the car to
fall, even though if only two had been present they would have provided sufficient force to get it over
the edge. Id.
235. Id. at 951. As a doctrinal matter, Carpenter won the debate before it began, for in a 1932
draft of the first Restatement of Torts, the American Law Institute adopted the position that liability
for the totality of the damage ought to attach to any actor whose conduct is a substantial force in
wrongfully bringing about any indivisible injury. RESTATEMENT OF TORTS § 307(2) (Tent. Draft
No. 8, 1932). This provision appeared in the final edition. RESTATEMENT OF TORTS § 432 (1934).
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plaintiff's injury,236 abandoning his principles on grounds of policy. 237 More-
over, even Justice Peaslee accepted the role of what he called "morality" in com-
pensating for causal acts.23 8 If but-for principles and compensation are not
congruent, basic concepts of fairness should begin to play a role.2 3 9 Between the
wrongdoer and the victim, the wrongdoer should pay.24° With respect to the
fairness of compensation in the sense of spreading losses among those best able
to bear them, a but-for threshold is unnecessary. Any causal linkage that the
system chooses will suffice, as will any system of identifying the losses to be
spread.24 1 It can hardly be doubted that between the discriminator and the vic-
tim of discrimination, the discriminator is in a better position to spread the loss.
2. Contributory or Comparative Fault
Some might argue that causal factors that are shortcomings of the victim
should bar or reduce compensation for the same reasons that contributory or
comparative fault does in negligence cases.242 Comparative fault and contribu-
tory fault, however, do not influence modern ideas of compensation. Twentieth-
century compensatory schemes, such as workers compensation and insurance,
do not apply comparative or contributory fault concepts.
243
Torts theorists contend that modem courts bar or reduce recovery for con-
tributory or comparative fault for policy reasons unrelated to compensation: to
provide would-be victims an incentive to take care, and to limit otherwise crush-
ing tort liability.244 Neither of those reasons justifies eliminating or reducing
236. At least one of Justice Peaslee's modem disciples agrees. Strachan, The Scope and Applica-
tion of the "But For" Causal Test, 33 MOD. L. REV. 386, 394 (1970).
237. Peaslee, supra note 173, at 1131. Justice Peaslee believed that this result was illogical, but
justified on moral grounds. He thought that morality did not justify any extension of liability to the
single tortfeasor whose conduct combined with an innocent or natural cause. Id.
238. Id. at 1128. Justice Peaslee feared that a jury might apply morality without guidance, how-
ever. Id. at 1129. He thought that both logic and correct moral guidance would yield a result of no
liability in the case of the single tortfeasor whose conduct combines with innocent causes. Id. at
1130.
Professors Becht and Miller sit on the fence in the Peaslee-Carpenter debate. In their classic
study of factual causation, Becht and Miller admit that the single tortfeasor whose conduct combines
with natural forces does in fact cause the harm, but say that damages is a separate issue from causa-
tion. A. BECHT & F. MILLER, supra note 166, at 123. Their position appears to be that the test of
causation is wholly one of fact, id. at 1-5, but that compensation tests do have a policy component,
see id. at 124. To the extent that the policy discussion of this Article is persuasive, it militates in
favor of full relief under both the topic of cause and that of damages.
239. See McGregor, Variations on an Enigma: Successive Causes of Personal Injury, 33 MOD. L.
REV. 378, 381 (1970).
240. See Carpenter, supra note 130, at 951.
241. Calabresi, supra note 178, at 73-76.
242. See generally W. PROSSER & W. KEETON, supra note 43, §§ 65, 67 (discussing contributory
negligence and comparative negligence).
243. E.g., Borgnis v. Falk Co., 147 Wis. 327, 133 N.W. 209 (1911) (workers compensation).
244. W. PROSSER & W. KEETON, supra note 43, § 65, at 452-53. Prosser and Keeton emphasize
that causation concepts do not justify barring recovery for contributory negligence:
[C]ourts have explained [contributory negligence] in terms of "proximate cause.". . . But
this cannot be supported unless a meaning is assigned to proximate cause which goes be-
yond anything applied elsewhere. If two automobiles collide and injure a bystander, the
negligence of one driver is not held to be an "insulating cause" which relieves the other of
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compensation in mixed motive discrimination cases. 245 The employees'
equivalent of taking care is the acquisition of job qualifications and good per-
formance of job duties. Economic rewards will always provide overwhelming
incentives for employees to do those things. The incentives do not noticeably
diminish because of the bare possibility of recovery when employee failings com-
bine with discrimination to produce discharge or failure to hire. Crushing liabil-
ity is unlikely to be a problem in Title VII disparate treatment cases. The need
to prove intent to discriminate limits the number of judgments against employ-
ers.24 6 In the cases that succeed, courts restrict relief to wages and reinstate-




Some courts and commentators discussing torts analogous to mixed motive
discrimination justify limits on compensation by applying valuation ideas. But
those valuation ideas contradict prevailing law as well as sensible remedial pol-
icy, particularly in mixed motive discrimination cases.
Professor Henderson, for example, argues that when the harm would have
occurred anyway, the damages needed to compensate for the wrongdoing fall to
zero or nearly zero. 249 In a case in which the plaintiffs sued for the wrongful
death of a child who was killed by the negligent conduct of the defendant but
who would have died from other causes a moment later, the court refused to
award damages. 250 Henderson justifies the result by saying that the half-minute
life expectancy is worth virtually nothing.251 Some might argue that a job that
is about to be lost for nondiscriminatory reasons has similarly diminished value.
Though Henderson's valuation ideas seem reasonable in some examples,
they are analytically dubious. They lead to the conclusion that there will be no
damages for the wrongful death of someone with a ticket to sail on the Titanic
liability. So far as causation is concerned, it can hardly have any different effect when the
action is by one driver against the other.
Id. at 452 (footnotes omitted).
245. The moral force of the laws against discrimination militates against application of these
doctrines even if they were justified by compensation ideas. See infra text accompanying notes 284-
97.
246. See Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 269-70 (1976) (Brennan, J., dissenting).
247. 2 C. SULLIVAN, M. ZIMMER & R. RICHARDS, EMPLOYMENT DIsCRIMINATION § 15.1, at
54 (2d ed. 1988).
248. See infra text accompanying notes 319-23.
249. Henderson, A Defense of the Use of the Hypothetical Case to Resolve the Causation Issue:
The Need for an Expanded Rather than a Contracted Analysis, 47 TEx. L. REV. 183, 207-08 (1969).
Henderson distinguishes the dual tortfeasor cases from cases involving one tortfeasor and one natu-
ral cause, arguing that in the dual tortfeasor case the second tortfeasor deprives the victim of the
cause of action against the first tortfeasor for the entirety of the injury. Id. at 208. But as Carpenter
notes, the legal system has never recognized such a "deprivation" as a cognizable injury, Carpenter,
supra note 130, at 950, and even if it did, victims of two successive torts would fail to receive recov-
ery for the entirety of loss when one tortfeasor was judgment proof, rendering either the lost or the
new cause of action worthless, see id. at 951.
250. Dillon v. Twin State Gas & Electric Co., 85 N.H. 449, 163 A. 111 (1932).
25 1. Henderson, supra note 249, at 204-05.
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the next day.2 52 Although a piece of property has a sale value that might decline
because of the buyer's knowledge that it is about to sustain damage, 25 3 the
courts should not apply the same reasoning to decrease the compensation for
damage that a human being suffers.254 Allowing contributory cause to diminish
valuation is particularly inappropriate in mixed motive employment discrimina-
tion cases. A job is not a saleable commodity with a market value, much less a
commodity with a market value that fluctuates with the employee's current
qualifications and job performance. Moreover, Title VII's compensatory scheme
does not award damages for the hypothetical market value of a job. It instead
affords hiring orders and wages. 255 The use of hiring orders and wage awards
avoids the need for monetary valuation of the job itself.
256
This is not to say that valuation will be easy in every mixed motive discrimi-
nation case. As with any wrongful discharge from at-will employment, it is diffi-
cult to compute the amount of wages that ought to be awarded. The common
law's traditional way of dealing with this type of problem is to adopt a rule for
computation of damages that appears fair in the general run of cases, without
pretending that it precisely measures loss in any given case.2 57 In cases in which
an order to hire or rehire is appropriate, the formula of ordinary salary minus
monies earned in mitigation will yield back pay liability. When an order to hire
is impractical, a court might order limited periods of front pay, pay for a fixed
period or until the employee obtains another job, recognizing that the periods
chosen may be somewhat artificial.
2 58
4. Probabilistic Causal Apportionment
Some modem commentators discussing torts suggest that courts should use
probabilities to apportion losses between innocent and negligent concurring
causes.259 A court might apply such a theory to mixed motive discrimination
cases, reducing the damages when another reason to fire or refuse to hire con-
252. See Thode, A Reply to the Defense of the Use of the Hypothetical Case to Resolve the Causa-
tion Issue, 47 TEx. L. REv. 1344, 1355-57 (1969).
253. This is one of Henderson's examples. Henderson, supra note 249, at 207.
254. See Thode, The Indefensible Use of the Hypothetical Case to Determine Cause in Fact, 46
TEx. L. REv. 423, 430 (1968) (emphasizing that public policy against tortious conduct is often
strong enough to compel recovery in such cases).
255. See supra note 228.
256. Henderson's valuation theory is also inappropriate in mixed motive discrimination cases
because of the strong remedial goals other than compensation in these cases, such as deterrence and
furtherance of the community sense of justice. See infra text accompanying notes 273-97. Fairly
applying the theory would also be difficult.
257. See generally Note, Remedies for Employer's Wrongful Discharge of an Employee from Em-
ployment of an Indefinite Duration, 21 IND. L. REv. 547, 548 (1988) (discussing traditional rule that
deemed unspecified term of employment to be for one year).
258. See generally infra text accompanying notes 319-20 (discussing remedies that might be used
when hiring or reinstatement is inappropriate).
259. King, Causation, Valuation and Chance in Personal Injury Torts Involving Preexisting Con-
ditions and Future Consequences, 90 YALE L.J. 1353 (1981). King argues:
The defendant should be subject to liability only to the extent that he tortiously contrib-
uted to the harm by allowing a preexisting condition to progress or by aggravating or
accelerating its harmful effects, or to the extent that he otherwise caused harm in excess of
that attributable soley [sic] to preexisting conditions. The effect of preexisting conditions
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tributed to the decision. The court would calculate the probability that the dis-
criminatory motive alone would have caused the adverse action, compare it to
the probability that the innocent motive would have, and apportion back pay or
other relief based on the comparative likelihood of adverse action on account of
the guilty motive and the innocent one.
Both the theory and its application to mixed motive cases are unsound,
however. Probabilistic causation confuses prospective and retrospective risk
analyses. 260 A bolt of lightning is highly improbable viewed from before its
strike, but it is 100 percent probable in retrospect. Indeed, every cause or con-
tributory cause is 100 percent probable if the probabilities are retrospective. A
court therefore cannot apportion compensation on the basis of retrospective
probabilities. Prospective probabilities, however, are irrelevant to cause and so
cannot apportion compensation on its basis.261 Walking to work through an
area populated by experienced armed robbers may increase the probabilities of
being robbed, but one might still be robbed for causes that have nothing to do
with walking through such an area (say, if the victim is robbed there by someone
who is not an experienced armed robber). 262 Moreover, comparative prospec-
tive probabilities do not correspond to sensible proportional obligations to com-
pensate. Drivers of Ferraris may be more likely to mow down pedestrians than
drivers of Fords, but if the negligence of both combines to injure a victim, com-
pensation does not demand that the Ferrari driver pay more and the Ford driver
pay less.
263
Mixed motive cases feature not only those logical obstacles to probabilistic
diminution of relief but also strong policies favoring full compensation. 264 Even
if proportional probabilities were permitted to influence compensation, they
should depend on the extent to which such conditions affect the present and future value of
the interest lost.
Id. at 1360 (footnote omitted). King would express the contribution of the tortious conduct in terms
of enhanced probability. Id. at 1387-90. He would extend the idea of compensation based on
probabilities to award damages based on all loss of chances of a favorable outcome, and all enhance-
ment of chances of an unfavorable outcome, even when the chances lost or gained are less than 50%.
Id. at 1354. Professors Rizzo and Arnold apply similar ideas to cases of simultaneous (rather than
preexisting) causal conditions. Rizzo & Arnold, Causal Apportionment in the Law of Torts: An
Economic Theory, 80 COLUM. L. REv. 1399 (1980); see Rizzo & Arnold, Causal Apportionment.
Reply to the Critics, 15 J. LEGAL STUD. 219 (1986).
260. Wright, The Efficiency Theory of Causation and Responsibility Unscientific Formalism and
False Semantics, 63 CHI.[-]KENT L. REV. 553, 560 (1987). For additional criticisms, see Kaye &
Aickin, A Comment on CausalApportionment, 13 J. LEGAL STUD. 191 (1984); Kelman, supra note
182, at 608-21; Kruskal, Terms of Reference: Singular Confusion About Multiple Causation, 15 J.
LEGAL STUD. 427 (1986).
261. Indeed, many scholars contend that there is no defense except convenience for even the
limited probabilistic or other apportionment that occurs when a court rejects a causal factor as not
dominant or not a substantial factor. Wright, supra note 22, at 1782-83; see Green, supra note 176,
at 554. There is no coherent definition of what condition or act is more substantial than any other
when more than one combine to bring about a harm. See Epstein, Causation-In Context: An
Afterword, 63 CHI.[-]KENT L. REv. 653, 671 (1987); Kruskal, supra note 260, at 435 & n.9.
262. See Kelman, supra note 182, at 603.
263. The example highlights another problem in using probabilities, that of perspective used in
assessing the prospective probabilities. From the pedestrian's standpoint, she is far more likely to be
hit by a Ford than a Ferrari, because there are more Fords.
264. See infra text accompanying notes 284-97.
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should not override relevant policy considerations. 265
5. Compensation in Perspective
The law does not make strict compensation an absolute goal. Considera-
tions of deterrence, expression of the community's sense of justice, or prevention
of self-help may outweigh the narrow goal of avoiding overcompensation.
266
For mere convenience, courts use artificial damage rules even though the rules
may overcompensate or undercompensate in individual cases. 267 To afford extra
protection to property rights, courts impose restitutionary remedies, which far
exceed compensation for plaintiff's loss. 268 The concept of permitting overcom-
pensation in order to achieve other goals is a familiar one throughout the field of
equitable remedies. At equity, courts implement remedies that exceed the nar-
row violation of rights on which the remedies are based in order to prevent
recurrence of unlawful conditions, 269 or, more broadly, in order to give "mean-
265. See infra text accompanying notes 298-328. Professor Robert Cole puts forward a sophisti-
cated approach to remedies for negligence that uses probabilities to adjust damages in some cases.
Cole, Windfall and Probability: A Study of "Cause" in Negligence Law: Part One, Uses of Causal
Language, 52 CAL. L. REV. 459 (1964) [hereinafter Cole, Part One]; Cole, Part Two, Factual Uncer-
tainty and Competitive Fairness, 52 CAL. L. REv. 764, 802 (1964) [hereinafter Cole, Part Tvo]. In
general, Cole maintains that the concept of factual cause derives its meaning from economic, social,
and moral ideas about who should pay. As long as the defendant has something to do with the
injury, the function of the question of causation in negligence cases is simply to pose the question
whether it is appropriate to make the defendant pay. Cole, Part One, supra, at 473; see id. at 498,
Cole recognizes that probabilities play a role in the formation of all causal beliefs, Cole, Part Two,
supra, at 785, and so they influence whether it is appropriate for someone who has enhanced the
probabilities of the occurrence to pay when it occurs. He emphasizes, however, that negligence law
should not always seek to discover and apply the probabilities of events that did not take place. The
effort is impossible to achieve and costly to attempt. Id. at 784-90. It is worthwhile to estimate
probabilities and reduce damages only in cases where the task is easy and an outside observer would
class an award of full damages as a windfall. Id. at 812-13. The classification of damages as wind-
falls or not thus returns the theory to its point ofdeparture: economic, social and moral policies that
form the compensatory and retributive aims oftort law. Cole, Part One, supra, at 498. Although its
use of probabilities is vulnerable to Professor Wright's and others' challenges, Cole's theory at least
recognizes that both ordinary language and the well-considered opinions of the courts use economic,
moral and social policy to influence what they mean when they speak of compensation.
266. See Thode, supra note 254, at 430-31. Although Professor Weinrib argues that equality and
corrective justice require a torts system in which the tortfeasor is liable only to the extent that it has
caused the victim harm, Weinrib, Causation and Wrongdoing, supra note 178, at 426, 450, Professor
Coleman persuasively responds that any system of uniform rules ensures equality, and that the de-
mands of corrective justice depend simply on the definition of the rights the system will protect,
Coleman, Property, Wrongfulness and the Duty to Compensate, 63 CHI.[-]KENT L. REV. 451, 458,
463 (1987).
267. D. DOBBS, supra note 142, at 799; see supra note 181; cf. C. McCORMICK, HANDBOOK ON
THE LAW OF DAMAGES § 16 (1935) (discussing limits on avenues of attack on damages awards
chosen by juries even where support for award is weak).
268. D. DOBBS, supra note 142, at 223. This is not to propose a restitutionary remedy in the
cases under consideration, but simply to show that the legal system frequently subordinates the goal
of exact compensation. In discrimination cases, the gain to the discriminator may be less than the
harm to the person discriminated against. R. POSNER, supra note 224, at 615; cf D. LAYCOCK,
supra note 181, at 494 (discussing restitution for failures to make safety expenditures in accident
cases).
269. Eg., Hutto v. Finney, 437 U.S. 678, 690-91 (1978); Bailey v. Proctor, 160 F.2d 78, 81 (lst
Cir.), cert. denied, 331 U.S. 834 (1947). Professor Laycock criticizes the latter case, but notes that it
,.represents a... tradition" in which once a case is brought into equity, the chancellor is to set it
right, rather than merely restore the plaintiff to an original position. D. LAYCOCK, supra note 18 1,
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ing to our public values." 270
Even if a court were to apply the narrowest but-for concept of compensa-
tion, the court would have to compensate the hidden injuries of discrimination.
For example, an applicant who is excluded by discrimination early in the appli-
cation process might have been considered for a job other than the one for which
she applied, or the job might have been modified to meet the applicant's abilities
or special needs. 271 Simply matching the qualifications of the applicant with the
requirements of the job yields a totally misleading answer to the question
whether the employer would have hired the applicant if it had not discriminated.
There is no good way ever to know if any of the possible contingencies might
have taken place, and the defendant can easily manipulate what scarce informa-
tion might support a guess on the subject. Even if the chances of such an occur-
rence are modest for any individual job application, the chances rise with
additional applications and additional discriminatory rejections.272 Full relief in
mixed motive cases ensures compensation for those losses.
B. Deterrence
Imposing full damages and other relief on the defendant when the harm
would have happened anyway enhances the deterrent effect of the antidis-
crimination laws. The laws seek to eliminate discrimination. Imposing remedies
even when other causes would have had the same result increases deterrence by
raising the likelihood of sanction. 273 As a general matter, deterrence does not
hinge on causation. 274 Indeed, the criminal law deters wrongdoing by punishing
attempts and other conduct in which the wrongdoer's actions fail to cause harm
in any sense.275 Accordingly, the criminal law imposes full punishment when
the defendant's conduct is a substantial factor in bringing about harm, even if
at 251; see Goldstein, A Swann Song for Remedies: Equitable Relief in the Burger Court, 13 HARV.
C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 1 (1978).
270. Fiss, Foreword: The Forms of Justice, 93 HARV. L. REV. 1, 14 (1979).
271. See School Bd. v. Arline, 480 U.S. 273, 287 n.17 (1987) (discussing reasonable accommoda-
tion to permit handicapped employee to perform job).
272. Discussing the economic loss from discrimination, Professor Posner notes that while dis-
crimination by whites harms whites, it harms blacks more, because blacks make up a much smaller
section of the American population and control much less of its economy. R. POSNER, supra note
224, at 615-16. Because discrimination often takes place in secret, it is probable that many discrimi-
nators escape liability. That secrecy enhances the likelihood of uncompensated injury of the type
discussed in the text, if the court adheres to Mount Healthy ideas of compensation.
273. See infra text accompanying note 280.
274. If specific deterrence were the only goal of tort law, collectively proscribed behavior
would be penalized regardless of whether in a specific instance it was a but for cause of
harm. If drunken driving were forbidden because of its accident-causing potential, the
drunken driver would be penalized whether he had been caught as a result of chance, of an
accident, or of some other attention-getting behavior. Moreover, even if the driver were
caught because he had been involved in an accident, a penalty would be imposed without
reference to the specific cause of the accident ....
Calabresi, supra note 178, at 79 (emphasis in original); see Wright, Actual Causation vs. Probabilistic
Linkage: The Bane of Economic Analysis, 14 J. LEGAL STUD. 435, 441-44, 453-54 (1985). Brodin
makes a similar point with respect to mixed motive discrimination. Brodin, supra note 12, at 317-19.
275. W. LAFAvE & A. ScoTr, supra note 177, § 3.12(b), at 280 (collecting cases).
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the but-for test is not satisfied. 276 The merit of this position is not limited to
criminal cases. Enhancing deterrence is a major justification for restitution and
other equitable remedies that do more to prevent recurrence of wrongdoing than
merely compensating the plaintiff for the violation of law on which the suit is
based.
27 7
Nevertheless, some argue that awarding full remedies when the harm would
have occurred anyway will create overdeterrence. 27 8 Imposing the same penalty
for mixed motive and sole motive discrimination will not overdeter the wrongful
conduct. On the contrary, the prospect of escaping any penalty for discriminat-
ing underdeters that conduct. 279 It is the expectation of liability that deters
wrongdoing. 2 80 Potential wrongdoers will not choose adequate levels of care in
negligence cases or adequate levels of internal antidiscrimination activity unless
there is at least the possibility that the full cost of the wrongdoing may fall on
them.2 81 Even if the law imposes liability on wrongdoers for events that they
could not have prevented, the sanctions will not overdeter in the sense of induc-
ing inefficient behavior. 2 82 According to Professors Landes and Posner, an eco-
nomically rational actor will not engage in wrongdoing if the damages are one
cent over the benefit from the wrongdoing. Thus the actor will not violate the
law, and the "excessive" liability will never be imposed.
283
C. Community Sense of Justice
The basis of the laws against discrimination is justice.284 Other grounds for
imposition of liability find primary support in efficiency, tradition, or political
considerations, but discrimination entails liability because it is wrong.285 Race
276. Id.
277. See supra notes 268-69 and accompanying text.
278. See H. HART & T. HONORE, supra note 167, at lxxii-lxxiii (distinguishing "market" from
"collective" deterrence).
279. Eaton, supra note 13, at 456; see Wright, supra note 274, at 442 (failure of market deter-
rence due to unrecovered costs of litigation and limits on the valuation and legal recovery of actual
losses).
280. Landes & Posner, Joint and Multiple Tortfeasors: An Economic Analysis, 9 J. LEGAL STUD.
517, 520 (1980). Landes and Posner point out that it is a confusion of ex ante and expost causation
to argue that because resources should not be spent to deter the inevitable, damages should not be
awarded when the harm would have occurred anyway. Id.
281. See id. at 524-25; Wright, supra note 260, at 569-71.
282. Landes & Posner, supra note 178, at 117.
283. Id. Landes and Posner nevertheless claim, contrary to the case law, see supra text accom-
panying notes 109-42, that "the law does not impose liability in cases in which taking care would not
have avoided the accident that occurred," because of administrative costs and the fact that an ele-
ment of strict liability exists in negligence cases, Landes & Posner, supra note 178, at 118. Inten-
tional discrimination contains no such element of strict liability, so the only problem is
administrative costs, the cost of transferring money in cases in which the wrongdoer behaves irra-
tionally or the system commits an error. Any enhancement in administrative costs is justified to end
the current state of underdeterrence and to accomplish the other goals of antidiscrimination reme-
dies. The common law does just that in some of the areas already surveyed. See Calabresi, supra
note 178, at 100-01.
284. Professor Spann suggests that subjective conceptions of justice are not only the foundation
of the law, but the only basis that the courts actually use for interpreting it. Spann, Simple Justice,
73 GEO. L.J. 1041 (1985).
285. Debate rages about whether, and to what extent, antidiscrimination law promotes economic
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discrimination offends the community sense of justice for two reasons: first, a
person's race is not an accurate predictor of that individual's merit as an em-
ployee, customer, or voter; second, a person's race is totally beyond that individ-
ual's control. 28 6 Discrimination on sex, religion, and other grounds offends the
community's sense of justice for the same reasons. Moreover, discrimination
against any group wrongly subordinates the human dignity of the group and its
members.287 Laws forbidding discrimination thus advance the moral thrust of
social justice.
288
Discrimination offends social justice regardless of whether the adverse effect
of the discrimination would have occurred anyway. The immorality of acts does
not depend on their efficacy. 2 89 Imposing full relief in mixed motive cases will
vindicate the community's moral standards.
Closely linked to justice and morality in the enforcement of discrimination
laws is the prevention of attempts at self-help. If the government does not pro-
vide means of redress when persons suffer wrongs that trigger their moral out-
rage, the victims will try to obtain redress even at the cost of the public order.
Just as prevention of disorderly self-help solutions is important in such areas of
the law as contracts 290 and criminal law,2 91 so it is vitally important in the field
of antidiscrimination. Indeed, the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and subsequent en-
actments grew out of violent social struggle provoked by blacks' self-help efforts
to achieve equality. 292 Reducing the inclination of members of disfavored
groups to take their grievances to the streets depends on the elimination of dis-
crimination in all instances in which adverse effects take place. That is so irre-
spective of whether the adverse effects would have occurred for other reasons.
Some members of the community might feel less outrage when the factor
that would have produced the adverse effect in the absence of the discrimination
is of the victim's own making, such as absenteeism or the failure to obtain job
training. Even granting that the special merit, innocence, or vulnerability of the
efficiency. See, eg., Donohue, Further Thoughts on Employment Discrimination Legislation: A Re-
ply to Judge Posner, 136 U. PA. L. REv. 523 (1987); Donohue, Is Title VII Efficient?, 134 U. PA. L.
REV. 1411 (1986); Posner, The Efficiency and Efficacy of Title VII, 136 U. PA. L. REV. 513 (1987).
286. See Fiss, A Theory of Fair Employment Laws, 38 U. CHI. L. REv. 235, 241 (1971).
287. See Colker, Anti-Subordination Above All: Sex, Race, and Equal Protection, 61 N.Y.U. L.
REv. 1003 (1986).
288. Equality lies at the base of the modem contractarian view of social justice. See J. RAWLS,
A THEORY OF JUSTICE § 77, at 505-07 (1971).
289. See Rothstein, Causation in Torts, Crimes, and Moral Philosophy: A Reply to Professor
Thomson, 76 GEO. L.J. 151 (1987) (defending view); Thomson, The Decline of Cause, 76 GEo. L.J.
137 (1987) (attributing view to "moral sophisticates" and questioning it).
290. There is more than one purpose underlying the rules of law that provide for the giving
of damages for breach of contract. One of the ends to be obtained is, without doubt, the
keeping of the peace. The party injured by the breach has a sense of grievance. In the
absence of a public remedy, he would do his best to redress his own wrong. This means
private war, with all of the resulting harm that it entails to the interests of other people.
5 A. CORBIN, supra note 145, § 1002.
291. 2 J. STEPHENS, HISTORY OF THE CRIMINAL LAW IN ENGLAND 80 (1883).
292. President Kennedy endorsed fair employment legislation in a speech that stressed the "ris-
ing tide of discontent that threatens the public safety" in the wake of black protests and violent white
reaction. 109 CONG. REC. 11,174 (June 19, 1963). See generally F. PIVEN & R. CLOWARD, POOR
PEOPLE'S MovEMENTS 206-39 (Vintage ed. 1979) (discussing history of the civil rights movement).
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victim of a wrongful act may inspire greater sympathy than would otherwise
occur, prevailing conceptions of morality do not excuse wrongful conduct on the
ground that the victim is not meritorious, innocent, or vulnerable.
293
The moral force behind antidiscrimination law strengthens the argument
against applying contributory or comparative fault analogies. The employer has
not been simply careless. It has treated the victim as less than human. 294 Its
conduct, moreover, has reinforced the powerlessness and coercion that women
and minorities experience.2 95 Just as contributory negligence does not bar liabil-
ity for intentional torts296 or for wanton and willful misconduct,2 97 the victim's
job failings should not bar liability for intentional discrimination.
D. Consistency with Title VII
Even if the proposed approach to mixed motive discrimination satisfies the
goals of compensation, deterrence and vindication of the community sense of
justice, it must be consistent with statutory provisions and practicality. Analyz-
ing Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964298 shows that full relief in mixed
motive cases furthers statutory policy.
The Supreme Court has declared that the "central statutory purposes" of
Title VII are "eradicating discrimination throughout the economy and making
persons whole for injuries suffered through past discrimination. '299 The former
purpose suggests a deterrent orientation.30° Awarding full relief in mixed mo-
tive cases will promote deterrence. 301 The latter purpose compels courts to ap-
ply a "presumption in favor of retroactive liability [which] can seldom be
overcome." 302 Logically, it also should compel courts to impose full relief, not
to eliminate liability, whenever the harm would have occurred in the absence of
discrimination. Expression of the community's sense of justice and prevention
of self-help are also among the purposes of Title VII remedies.303 Full relief will
promote those purposes.
The language of Title VII provides for such remedies as hiring, reinstate-
293. See W. LAFAvE & A. SCOTr, supra note 177, § 3.12(a), at 791 (discussing extortion). Ob-
viously, any approach could bar relief if the "victim" of mixed motive discrimination is not a victim
at all but instead asserts a false claim to achieve a fraudulent settlement or verdict. Considerations
of practicality of relief for some persons who lack the qualifications to take advantage of it are
discussed infra text accompanying notes 319-23.
294. See Kinoy, The Constitutional Right of Negro Freedom, 21 RUTGERS L. REV. 387, 391-93
(1967).
295. See Colker, supra note 287, at 1008-10 nn.15-17.
296. W. PROSSER & W. KEETON, supra note 43, § 65, at 462.
297. Id.
298. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e to 2000e-17 (1982).
299. Albermarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405, 421 (1975); see Price Waterhouse, 109 S. Ct.
at 1798 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
300. See Price Waterhouse, 109 S. Ct. at 1798 (O'Connor, J., concurring) ("Like the common
law of torts, the statutory employment 'tort' created by Title VII has two basic purposes. The first is
to deter conduct which has been identified as contrary to public policy and harmful to society as a
whole."); 2 C. SULLIVAN, M. ZIMMER & R. RICHARDS, supra note 247, § 15.1, at 53-55.
301. See supra text accompanying notes 273-83.
302. City of Los Angeles v. Manhart, 435 U.S. 702, 719 (1978).
303. See supra notes 284-97 and accompanying text.
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ment and back pay, with no limit other than a court's determination of what is
appropriate. 3°4 Courts must apply a presumption of back pay when exercising
that discretion .3 0  Title VII generally restricts remedies to equitable relief,306
but that restriction does not cut against back pay and hiring in mixed motive
cases. Equity has no distinct remedial rule more restrictive than that found in
the common-law cases on mixed motive and concurrent cause. In fact, equity
generally tolerates a greater disjunction between injury and remedy than does
the common law.
30 7
Some might argue against full relief on the basis of section 706(g) of the
statute:
No order of the court shall require ... the hiring, reinstatement, or
promotion of an individual.., or the payment to him of any back pay,
if such individual... was refused employment or advancement or was
suspended or discharged for any reason other than discrimination on
account of race, color, religion, sex, or national origin or in violation of
section 2000e-3(a) of this title [retaliation]. 30 8
Congress' use of the words "for any reason other than" does not appear to be an
effort to eliminate liability or limit relief in mixed motive cases. If that had been
Congress's purpose, the lawmakers probably would have used the language
"solely on account of."' 3 0 9 Congress rejected an amendment that employed that
language310 and would have restricted liability to cases in which discrimination
was the sole cause.
311
Congress modeled section 706(g) on a National Labor Relations Act provi-
sion 312 that had been interpreted to permit "dual motive" cases, in which courts
gave reinstatement and full back pay, even though the victims of discrimination
would have been discharged on other grounds. 313 Congress' rejection of the sole
purpose language314 and its application of the National Labor Relations Act
model demonstrates that it meant to permit full relief in mixed motive cases.315
304. If the court finds that the respondent has intentionally engaged or is intentionally en-
gaging in an unlawful employment practice... the court may enjoin the respondent...
and order such affirmative action as may be appropriate, which may include, but is not
limited to, reinstatement or hiring of employees, with or without back pay.., or any other
equitable relief as the court deems appropriate.
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g) (1982).
305. See supra note 302 and accompanying text.
306. 2 C. SULLIVAN, M. ZIMMER & R. RICHARDS, supra note 247, § 15.1, at 54.
307. See supra text accompanying notes, 269-70.
308. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g) (1982).
309. This language is found in a few retaliatory eviction statutes. See supra note 124 and accom-
panying text.
310. 110 CONG. REc. 13,837-38 (June 15, 1964).
311. Vaas, supra note 197, at 456.
312. 29 U.S.C. § 160(c) (1982).
313. NLRB v. West Side Carpet Cleaning Co., 329 F.2d 758, 761 (6th Cir. 1964); NLRB v.
Symons Mfg. Co., 328 F.2d 835, 837 (7th Cir. 1964); NLRB v. Whitin Mach. Works, 204 F.2d 883,
885 (Ist Cir. 1953).
314. See Price Waterhouse, 109 S. Ct. at 1785 & n.7 (plurality opinion).
315. Nevertheless, the use of the singular "reason" may have been an endorsement of the idea
that a court should find a dominant reason, that is, in cases of mixed motive, a dominant motive.
Under this interpretation, the court should act as though the dominant motive were the sole active
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Miscellaneous statements in the legislative history of Title VII and judicial
constructions of that history speak of victims' "restor[ation] to a position where
they would have been were it not for the unlawful discrimination" 3 16 or declare
that "it]he injured party is to be placed, as near as may be, in the situation he
would have occupied if the wrong had not been committed. ' 31 7 Those state-
ments do not address mixed motive cases in particular and seem intended to
support an expansive interpretation of the remedies available under the statute;
they do not undermine the idea of full relief in mixed motive cases. Signifi-
cantly, the Supreme Court has held that those statements, as well as the restric-
tion on relief in section 706(g), do not operate to bar Title VII remedies that
benefit even nonvictims of discrimination, when the discriminatory conduct is
sufficiently outrageous and cannot be corrected by other means.
318
force in the decision to hire or discharge, and award full relief in Title VII mixed motive cases only
upon a showing that the discriminatory motive was dominant, rather than that it was a substantial
factor. But Justice Brennan's plurality opinion in Price Waterhouse casts doubt on any such inter-
pretation. The opinion analyzed the interpretation of section 706(g) in pattern and practice suits and
class actions and its origin in a National Labor Relations Act similarly applicable in company wide
or industry wide actions. It concluded that "the proper focus of § 706(g) is on claims of systemic
discrimination, not on charges of individual discrimination." Id. at 1788 n. 10. Thus the provision
may be wholly irrelevant to the question at hand.
316. 118 CONG. REc. 7168 (March 6, 1972).
317. Albermarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405, 418-19 (1975).
318. Local 28, Sheet Metal Workers Int'l Ass'n v. EEOC, 478 U.S. 421, 445-75, 483-84 (1986).
That holding goes significantly beyond the proposal in this Article that relief extend to actual victims
of discrimination when the victims would nevertheless have suffered the adverse effect complained
of. Firefighters Local Union No. 1784 v. Stotts, 467 U.S. 561 (1984), reversed the affirmance of a
consent decree that imposed layoffs on white employees while retaining blacks with less seniority.
Stotts does not bar this Article's proposal, for it only restricts some forms of relief for nonvictims of
discrimination. See id. at 579-80.
Both the Price Waterhouse plurality and Justice White laid great stress on the analogy between
mixed motive cases brought under Title VII and Mount Healthy City School District Board of Educa-
tion v. Doyle, a mixed motive case brought-under the Civil Rights Act of 1871, 42 U.S.C. § 1983
(1982). The logic of compensation and deterrence that calls for liability and full relief in Title VII
cases would apply equally to section 1983 cases. Moreover, liability and full relief would further the
particular statutory policy of section 1983.
Section 1983 does not provide substantive rights, but it does establish a private right of action to
remedy claims against persons acting under color of state law who have violated federal statutes and
constitutional provisions. Maine v. Thiboutot, 448 U.S. 1, 4 (1980); Chapman v. Houston Welfare
Rights Org., 441 U.S. 600, 618 (1979). Among those federal substantive laws are several prohibiting
discrimination, such as the equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment to the United States
Constitution and the political and religious freedom provisions of the first amendment.
Congress enacted section 1983 as part of the Civil Rights Act of 1871, ch. 22, § 1, 17 Stat. 13, in
order to permit black victims of officially protected racial misconduct to bypass hostile state court
systems; its text leaves its remedies entirely open ended. Under prevailing interpretations, appropri-
ate relief includes compensatory damages, Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167, 172 (1961), punitive dam-
ages, Smith v. Wade, 461 U.S. 30, 56 (1983), and nominal damages, Carey v. Piphus, 435 U.S. 247,
266 (1978), as well as wide-ranging injunctive relief, see Hutto v. Finney, 437 U.S. 678, 687 (1978).
In determining the propriety of relief under section 1983, the Supreme Court looks first to the
common law of torts. Smith, 461 U.S. at 34; Carey, 435 U.S. at 257-58; see Martinez v. California,
444 U.S. 277, 285 (1980). The common law consensus, to which Mount Healthy is the exception, is
the rule of full relief. The Court makes "such modification or adaptation as might be necessary" in
the common law "to carry out the purpose and policy" of section 1983. Smith, 461 U.S. at 34. But
because the remedial policy of section 1983 is to compensate victims, deter wrongdoers, and vindi-
cate the law, see Carey, 435 U.S. at 254-57 & n. 11, the rule of full relief advances the purpose and
policy of the statute. Of course, if one believes that section 1983 lacks those remedial goals, section
1983 and Mount Healthy's interpretation of it provide little guidance for Title VII, and should be
disregarded in deciding mixed motive cases brought under that statute.
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E. Practicality
In some cases, practical considerations may call into question the wisdom
of granting full relief to victims of mixed motive discrimination. The most diffi-
cult cases are those in which full relief for discrimination entails an order to hire
or reinstate. For example, if an airline discriminates in denying a black a job as
a pilot, a court nonetheless would hesitate to order the airline to hire the victim
to fly planes unless the victim has the ability to do so. When hiring or reinstate-
ment would cause undue hardship to the defendant or nonparties, the court
should employ substitute relief.
3 19
Applying current doctrine, courts frequently have found alternatives to hir-
ing and reinstatement orders. Substitute solutions include front pay, that is, pay
until hiring or for a set period, and compelled funding of remedies other than
employment.320 Those solutions have proven especially valuable in cases in
which there are multiple claimants for the same job or in which the job has been
eliminated during the pendency of litigation.
32 1
Courts in those cases have applied the general rule that undue hardship
bars injunctive relief and compels the creation of alternative remedies, even
when the alternative remedies are not a complete substitute for injunctive relief.
The rule is familiar in equity.322 At least one authority suggests that law applies
a similar approach, avoiding crushing damages awards through artificial rules
about proximate cause and remoteness of injury.323 Courts using the approach
to mixed motive discrimination advanced in this Article will need to apply the
319. In a recent article, Professor West collects and analyzes research on reinstatement of em-
ployees under National Labor Relations Act and other proceedings. West, The Case Against Wrong-
ful Discharge, 1988 U. ILL. L. REV. 1. His research shows that reinstatement generally has been an
ineffective remedy for wrongful discharge, particularly if it takes place more.than a few months after
the event. Half the workers refuse reinstatement or trade it for a cash settlement. Id. at 28. Many
resign less than a year after being rehired, citing employer harassment. Id. at 29. Professor West
concludes that states abolishing at-will employment and establishing remedies for wrongful dis-
charge should not adopt hiring or reinstatement as an exclusive remedy; instead, they should con-
sider such measures as statutory damages plus back pay until the employee finds comparable
employment. Id. at 65. If more employees learn of the reality of reinstatement, there may be more
willingness to trade that relief for money, and therefore less practical difficulty with the approach to
mixed motive discrimination proposed by this Article. Moreover, if employers learn the same les-
son, they may be less inclined to resist the remedy, knowing that the employee is not likely to last
long after returning. Professor West's work makes substitutes to hiring or reinstatement appear to
be the best options in a wide variety of cases.
320. See, eg., King v. Staley, 849 F.2d 1143, 1144-45 (8th Cir. 1988) (front pay); Green v. USX
Corp., 843 F.2d 1511, 1532 (3d Cir. 1988) (front pay for two years when no job openings likely for
extended period of time), vacated, 109 S. Ct. 3151 (1989); Gunby v. Pennsylvania Elec. Co., 840 F.2d
1108, 1123-24 (3d Cir. 1988) (temporary salary increase and order to hire when suitable position
becomes available); Williams v. Boorstein, 451 F. Supp. 1117, 1127 (D.D.C. 1978) (order of funding
to assist victims of discrimination to assert grievances), rev'd, 663 F.2d 109 (D.C. Cir. 1980), cert
denied, 451 U.S. 985 (1981).
- 321. See, eg., Easley v. Anheuser-Busch, Inc., 758 F.2d 251, 263-64 (8th Cir. 1985) (layoff
before decision in case); Edwards v. Department of Corrections, 615 F. Supp. 804, 811 (M.D. Ala.
1985) (displacement of innocent employee).
322. For example, courts deny specific performance and substitute cash damages when plaintiff
is the innocent victim of defendant's breach of contract to violate a trust. 11 W. JAEGER, WILLIS-
TON ON CONTRACTS § 1429 & n.6 (3d ed. 1968) (citing Cyrus v. Holbrook, 32 Ky. L. Rep. 466, 106
S.W. 300 (1907); Repetto v. Baylor, 61 N.J. Eq. 501, 48 A. 774 (1901)).
323. See D. LAYcoCK, supra note 181, at 151-70, 926-29.
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same undue hardship standards to avoid remedies that would cause severe dan-
gers to employers or the general public.
One commentator suggests a further practical objection to the present pro-
posal in cases involving governmental defendants. 324 He hypothesizes that
Mount Healthy's real purpose in constitutional torts cases against government
officials is to protect the officials from court orders that they would view as
impractical or unduly intrusive.325 Still, he stops short of approving the case's
achievement of that goal, and he acknowledges that the effect is to override the
goals of compensation, vindication and deterrence in order to encourage "gov-
ernmental freedom to act."
' 326
The value of compensation, vindication (which includes reinforcing the
community's sense of justice and furthering the law's policy), and deterrence
should far outweigh the value of license to discriminate in violation of the law.
The conclusion is no different in constitutional torts than in the statutory tort of
employment discrimination. It might be argued that restrictions on remedies
protect not discrimination, but conduct in which there is no discrimination and
in which liability is wrongly imposed by another rule's shift in the risk of er-
ror.3 2 7 Yet limiting remedies cannot prevent any error that cannot be prevented
better by such ordinary means as cautionary instructions to factfinders, or good
faith, sovereign, and absolute immunities from some monetary relief.3 28
V. CONCLUSION
This Article has posited that an approach to mixed motive discrimination
that requires full relief is superior to the approach of the Court in Price
Waterhouse. Not only is such an approach consistent with common law analo-
gies, but it is also supported by causation theory. Most significantly, that ap-
proach to mixed motive cases advances the remedial goals of compensation,
deterrence, and vindication of the community sense of justice, and satisfies the
terms and policies of Title VII. There may be the risk that in some cases the
imposition of full relief will create undue hardship, but courts have ordinary
correctives to handle that problem. They may reduce or tailor remedial action
to prevent inappropriate results, while still vindicating the laws that forbid dis-
crimination. Price Waterhouse and its immediate forebear, Mount Healthy, are a
radical departure from the common law's approach to mixed motive cases. Pol-
icy justifies not that departure, but a new approach rooted in long-established
precedent.
324. Eaton, supra note 13.
325. Id. at 457. The decision creates a zone of noninterference for governmental functions, even
when governmental conduct violates the Constitution. Id. at 457 n.75.
326. Id. at 461.
327. See id. at 458 n.80.
328. See Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 815-19 (1982) (qualified immunity); Imbler v.
Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409, 427 (1976) (absolute immunity); Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651, 673-74
(1974) (sovereign immunity protected under eleventh amendment to United States Constitution),
Indeed, shifting the burden of persuasion to the defendant on the issue whether it would have made
the same decision anyway is an attempt by the Court to make the risk of error fall in favor of the
plaintiff, on policy grounds. See Price Waterhouse, 109 S. Ct. at 1802-03 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
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One might wonder what has so effectively obscured logically applicable pre-
cedent and congressionally imposed policy. One of the themes of Professor
Bell's recent book, And We Are Not Saved,329 is that when conventional legal
rules work too effectively to promote the civil rights of blacks, the rules change;
society through its legislatures and courts applies the rules differently or invents
a new exception and says it was there all along.330 Rules that give damages for
malicious prosecution are one thing. Rules that give damages for employment
discrimination are quite another. It does not matter what the statute says; man-
agement prerogatives trump the civil rights of minorities and women.
Bell's pained, though not hopeless, 3 31 view of law and race in America re-
mains a minority position in both senses of the term.332 No one can say whether
it represents the future of antidiscrimination law or an unduly negative view of
its past. Price Waterhouse neither exemplifies nor refutes Bell's theme. The
plaintiff still has a chance to win a high-level job and large damages. Her case
perhaps has already provoked a change in the outward behavior of companies
like Price Waterhouse. She and those with similar cases benefit from a shift in
the burden of persuasion, a procedural advantage that ever fewer civil rights
plaintiffs enjoy.333 Nevertheless, the rules the Supreme Court has applied to her
case are not the same as the rules for analogous cases outside the antidiscrimina-
tion field. The rules defy logic and policy. The future course of those rules may
thus test Bell's thesis.
329. D. BELL, AND WE ARE NOT SAVED: THE ELUSIVE QUEST FOR RACIAL JUSTICE (1987).
The book is expanded from Professor Bell's Harvard Law Review Foreword to the 1984 Supreme
Court Term, Bell, The Supreme Court, 1984 Term-Foreword: The Civil Rights Chronicles, 99
HARV. L. REV. 4 (1985). The book and the article consist of a dialogue between the author and a
black civil rights lawyer recovering from dementia who has experienced visions that show her the
futility of conventional legal efforts to achieve racial equality.
330. See, eg., D. BELL, supra note 329, at 66-68 (discussing reapportionment law). Although
the book contains a discussion of the experience of black women, it is unclear whether its thesis
might extend to women who are not black, or to victims of religious prejudice and ethnic minorities
other than blacks. See id. at 176-214. But see id. at 210-11 (discussing society's "patriarchal or-
der"). The proposal made in this Article would protect the rights of women and victims of religious
and ethnic prejudice. For analyzing the significance of Professor Bell's position, however, it is im-
portant only that the proposal would advance the interests of blacks.
331. At the end of the book, Professor Bell suggests that civil rights litigation, in combination
with hoped-for social developments, might lead to a change in pervasive discrimination against
blacks. See id. at 249-58.
332. Although the reviews of the book were generally favorable, eg., Delgado, Derrick Bell and
the Ideology of Racial Reform: Will We Ever Be Saved? (Book Review), 97 YALE L.J. 923 (1988);
Kennedy, Book Review, 86 MIcH. L. REV. 1130 (1988); Yu, Book Review, 23 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L.
REV. 287 (1988), it is doubtful that their authors represent the mainstream of American opinion.
333. See Wards Cove Packing Co. v. Atonio, 109 S. Ct. 2115, 2126 (1989).
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